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Abstract
British spy fiction author John le Carré inspired Cultural Détente, a movement in
American popular culture which banished the simplicities of the 1950’s and replaced it
with a relaxation of tensions from 1960-1965. Cultural Détente manifested from within
Western liberal, democratic society after the strict conformities of the 1950s. After the
dissipation of McCarthyism and the anti-Communist crusaders, the public was ready to
embrace a ‘thaw’ in tensions. Even with all of the evidence already in place, there has yet
to be any historical evaluation of a 1960s Cultural Détente that anticipated and made
possible the détente of Richard Nixon. It was an attitude, a break from accepting the
political and social status quo from the early Cold War; in which the Soviets had been the
monolithic, evil, powerful and threatening menace. People began to question the reflexive
anti-communism of the period. Not quite the New Left and Counterculture movements of
the mid to late-1960s, Cultural Détente bridged the gap between the initial-1950s
conservative policies to the liberal and radical reforms in the mid-1960s. John le Carré
was an artistic leader of Cultural Détente, using the popular spy fiction medium to
critique the contemporary state of the Cold War and the methods, tactics, and attitudes of
the West. He saw great hypocrisy in the Western governments’ political assertions,
especially the extended power of the United States. Expanding power meant excesses of
power, which led to a deep mistrust of governing authorities. Becoming antiEstablishment, a hallmark of Cultural Détente, le Carré and a vast range of Western
citizens no longer trusted that the ‘Establishment’ held society’s best interest in mind.
Whereas the 1950s message had been that the government and its institutions were there
to uphold and protect Western values and virtues, by 1960 it no longer held much weight
among some creative artists, who found a ready audience in the middle brow public. The
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anti-Establishment view quickly spread through the private sphere, bringing momentum
to Cultural Détente and critiques like John le Carré’s.
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Introduction
In July, 2002 the International Spy Museum in Washington D.C. opened its doors
to the public, providing a behind-the-scenes look at the history of spying, espionage, and
clandestine tradecraft. Exhibits, collections, photographs, and memorabilia afford an
interactive experience with the esoteric world of intelligence. The museum features
modern espionage tactics used in the elusive and shadowy Cold War. From technological
gadgets to details over high-profile spy cases in the West, the museum chronicles the
influence of espionage on Cold War popular culture. Spies were deemed the front line
soldiers in the unconventional, ideological war between democracy and communism.
Intelligence services in the West, especially in the US, vastly expanded during the
conflict, as the power of information became a key component in avoiding a nuclear war
and the “hot” front of the Cold War. Intelligence agents on both sides of the Iron Curtain
gathered secret information, conducted covert operations, recruited spies, and pursued
counterintelligence through the underground networks moving between the East and
West. Espionage became synonymous with the Cold War, influencing and shaping 20th
Century popular culture. The spy fiction genre grew to become one of the most popular
genres of the period, leading to a myriad of novels, major motion pictures and television
programs that enjoyed great success among the viewing audience. Additionally, the
intelligence methods utilized at the time enabled espionage to expand into the
computerized information age of the 21st century. The International Spy Museum has
become one of the most visited attractions in the capital city, bringing entertainment and
historical knowledge to new audiences long after the U.S. - Soviet confrontation has
ended.
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Despite its influence, espionage was just one facet of the extremely complex
global war. Over the last six decades, historians have analyzed virtually every aspect of
the East-West conflict. They have provided extensive analyses over the political,
economic, social, cultural, and ideological impacts of the clash between capitalism and
Communism.
The historical contributions to the Cold War are diverse and extensive. Most
historians follow one of three main views. The orthodox view, originating in the early
Cold War, held that it was the aggression and expansionist tendencies of the Soviet
Union that led to the U.S.-Soviet conflict. Early historical scholarship, including George
F. Kennan, subscribed to the traditional view. Historian John Lewis Gaddis continues to
use the orthodox view in his works The Cold War: A New History (2005) and We Now
Know: Rethinking Cold War History (1997). The second view took the opposing stance,
asserting that it was the United States who was responsible for starting the Cold War by
surrounding the Soviet Union through occupation forces and military bases in Europe and
Asia, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). Historians like Melvyn Bragg have provided research for the
revisionist viewpoint. The third view, and most modern, places equal blame on both
superpowers. Typically those historians who fall under this view analyze sub-branches of
the Cold War such as politics, economics, ideology, or culture. The following research
revolves around the history of Cold War popular culture; thus a brief mention of cultural
historians should be made. Cold War cultural historians often further analyze
subcategories impacting popular culture such as representations of the atomic bomb,
foreign policy, artistic movements, espionage, religion, or gender. The avenues of
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exploration become widespread, with an immense array of historical analyses. Sometimes
a combination of these subcategories helps to provide both width and depth to their
historical arguments. Historians Stephen J. Whitfield, Lisle Rose, Robert Ellwood, and
Martin Halliwell all examine 1950s American popular culture in their research and
writings. Whitfield provides an in-depth analysis over the politicization of culture in the
early 1950s to the dissent and eventual thaw as “a substitute for victory.”1 Lisle Rose and
Robert Ellwood both focus on 1950 as the critical year; as Rose examines the effects on
‘Main Street,’ while Ellwood points to the ‘crossroad of American religious life.’2 In The
Cold War Comes to Main Street: America in 1950, Rose describes the year as being the
watershed moment of the Cold War.3 It combined two lenses through which we can
understand the remainder of the conflict. First, was that the decade began with high hopes
and economic prosperity in a post-World War II world. However, that hope quickly gave
way to a “profound, embittered malaise” that continued to define culture through the
remainder of the Cold War.4 Halliwell contrasts his argument from Whitfield, Ellwood,
and Rose by examining a broader view of popular culture. In American Culture in the
1950s, he examines and looks beyond “the ‘cold war culture’ label.5 Halliwell argues that
he does not simply box 1950s thinking into the same habitual patterns of most cultural
historians.6 Instead he explores the “historical, ideological, and aesthetic contours of the
decade.”7 Both Margot A. Henriksen and Paul Boyer observe the revolutionary impact of
1

Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1991).
Lisle A. Rose, The Cold War Comes to Main Street: America in 1950. (Kansas: University Press of Kansas,
1999). Robert S. Ellwood, 1950: Crossroads of American Religious Life (Louisville KY: Westminster John
Knox Press, 2000).
3
Rose, The Cold War Comes to Main Street: America in 1950, 1.
4
Ibid.
5
Martin Halliwell, American Culture in the 1950s. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 5.
6
Martin Halliwell, American Culture in the 1950s, p. 5.
7
Ibid.
2
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the nuclear bomb in shaping atomic culture. In Boyer’s, By the Bomb’s Early Light and
Henriksen’s, Dr. Strangelove’s America they both use the atomic bomb as a lens through
which to view a fluid and changing culture.8 Henriksen juxtaposes the bomb with the
revolutionary generation of the 1960s that began reforms from earlier Cold War policies.
Additionally, historian Thomas Doherty interprets American popular culture through the
rise of television in his book, Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, McCarthyism, and
American Culture.9 He explores the rise of the new medium as a “featured player in the
action” and the ultimate influence it had on shaping new generations. The amount of
historical scholarship is quite inspiring with broad reaches towards subjects such as the
Hollywood Blacklists, Senator McCarthy, the Rosenbergs, the FBI, and the CIA.
Without question the critical studies of John le Carré conducted by Tony Barley,
Eric Homberger, and Peter Lewis have been invaluable over the course of this research.
They provided critical insights into le Carré’s central arguments, as well as basic
concepts in each of his spy fiction narratives. However, they have not placed le Carré
historically. Overall, these historians deliver unique, key insights into the political,
ideological, and social impacts of the 1950s and 1960s Cold War.10 An extensive
framework has been established from which new analyses can derive inspiration, bearing
in mind the crucial work that has come before them.

8

Paul S. Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age
(New York: Pantheon, 1985). Margot A. Henriksen, Dr. Strangelove’s America: Society and Culture in the
Atomic Age (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1997).
9
Thomas Doherty, Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, McCarthyism, and American Culture (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2003).
10
Other notable historians include: Stefan Kanfer, Eric. F. Goldman, Thomas C. Reeves, David M. Oshinsky,
Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton, and Robert Vaughn.
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Indispensable to this project is the Cold War spy fiction novels of British author
John le Carré. Furthermore, the numerous interviews he offered throughout his career
have facilitated a broader understanding of the man behind the novels. Le Carré was not
an author of historical fiction; yet his spy narratives retain all of the angst, emotion, and
turmoil that legitimately plagued Western culture during the East-West conflict. Le
Carré, this work will argue, inspired Cultural Détente, a movement in popular culture
which banished the simplistic and replaced it with a relaxation of tensions from 19601965. Cultural Détente manifested from within Western liberal, democratic society after
the strict conformities of the 1950s. The politicization of culture prevented dissent from
American anti-communism, leaving the public profoundly jaded. After the dissipation of
McCarthyism and the anti-Communist crusaders, along with the revelations concerning,
Iran, Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs, and other crises, the public was ready to embrace a
‘thaw’ in tensions. Even with all of the evidence already in place, there has yet to be any
historical evaluation of a 1960s Cultural Détente that anticipated and made possible the
détente of Richard Nixon. It was an attitude, a break from accepting the political and
social status quo from the early Cold War; in which the Soviets had been the monolithic,
evil, powerful and threatening menace. During this period, the Western government and
military claimed the ideas of promoting freedom and democracy; along with not violating
the rights of people at home or abroad. However, by the end of the decade citizens were
losing that trust and beginning to question the governments’ true motives. Thus, Cultural
Détente began to take shape. People questioned the reflexive anti-communism of the
1950s. Not quite the New Left and Counterculture movements of the mid to late-1960s,
Cultural Détente bridged the gap between the initial-1950s conservative policies to the
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liberal and radical reforms in the mid-1960s. John le Carré was an artistic leader of
Cultural Détente, using the popular spy fiction medium to critique the contemporary state
of the Cold War and the methods, tactics, and attitudes of the West. He saw great
hypocrisy in the Western governments’ political assertions, especially the extended
power of the United States. Expanding power meant excesses of power, which led to a
deep mistrust of governing authorities. Becoming anti-Establishment, a hallmark of
Cultural Détente, le Carré and a vast range of Western citizens no longer trusted that the
‘Establishment’ held society’s best interest in mind. Whereas the 1950s message had
been that the government and its institutions were there to uphold and protect Western
values and virtues, by 1960 it no longer held much weight among some creative artists,
who found a ready audience in the middle brow public. Additionally, the military was an
extension of that protection, fighting to defend democracy against the evils of
Communism. However, after the Korean War and the proliferation of atomic weapons,
people began to see that the military was just an extension of the governing powers,
upholding ‘principles’ defined by the Establishment. American men were sent into a war
that no one could really comprehend. North Korea was not the Soviet Union and though
it was fighting against Communists it appeared as though it was a just a strategic geopolitical move. Consequently, trust in the government and military began to wane in both
the United States and Great Britain. For Great Britain, the Suez Canal Campaign had
been a moment of military disaster, and again, a geo-political failure. The antiEstablishment view quickly spread through the private sphere, bringing momentum to
Cultural Détente and critiques like John le Carré’s.
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Another critical factor for le Carré and Cultural Détente was that the West,
especially America, made lofty claims about protecting the individual above the
collective; yet in principle was practicing something else. The interferences in other
regions in order to expand influence often caused significant turmoil and innocent lives.
A few examples of these intrusions were helping to overthrow legally elected
governments in Iran and Guatemala, ignoring the Polish and Hungarian “rebels,” and
brazenly overflying the Soviet Union with intelligence aircraft. At least the Soviet Union
acted in accordance to their ideology---they could place the collective above the
individual because it justified the means to an end. They made no pretensions about
protecting individuals for the sake of Marxist-Leninism. The collective was always more
important than the individual and they stood behind those principles in practice. By 1960,
the West did not have any real justifications behind their actions, because in principle
they were proving something different. Thus, the hypocrisy of democratic moralities
became a veil that was easily stripped away. These critiques, along with many others, are
the defining attributes of the Cultural Détente attitudes developing from 1960-1965.
Western Society and culture was already embracing a ‘thaw’ from tensions long before
politicians even began to think about it. By the time political Détente came about in the
1970s, Western society had already moved on from the fear and anger towards the Soviet
Communists to questioning their own governments and institutions. After the death of
Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev never appeared as ominous or daunting
to Western citizens; the real threat had been long gone. With all of this in mind, the
intentions of my analysis here is to utilize John le Carré’s spy fiction narratives as a
means to understand the roots of Cultural Détente. In the larger context of the Cold War
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this research will place the cultural ‘thaw’ in juxtaposition to the 1950s and 1960s
American political and cultural landscapes. This is an original, new concept that builds
upon the existing historical framework of American Cold War popular culture.
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Chapter 1
American culture during the 1950s was influenced by the ‘Red Scare,’ the U.S.Soviet nuclear arms race, and the growth of espionage. By 1950, the post-World War II
peace subsided as the United States went to war against North Korea. Although not a
direct military engagement against the Soviet Union, the Korean War was the first
official military conflict between democracy and Communism. It brought the larger
context of the Cold War to the forefront of society, making it difficult to deny that it was
now a dominant concern.11 At the same time, the development of thermonuclear weapons
progressed forward with both the United States and Soviet Union in possession of
weapons of mass destruction. The few lines of defense would be the idea of deterrence
and the intelligence information collected by the clandestine world of espionage. As the
nuclear arms race expanded between the two superpowers, so too did intelligence
agencies and bureaucracies. Spies became the new Cold Warriors in the unconventional
and ideological war. Once Soviet spies were uncovered in the West, the public began to
fear a Communist infiltration at home. The idea of a Communist threat both within and
without quickly spread, shaping and influencing political and social policies throughout
the 1950s.
Politics enmeshed in popular culture causing significant turmoil over civil
liberties and freedom of expression. The added intensity over the escalation of expansion
in nuclear arsenals only deepened the public’s anxiety about the nature of the Cold War.
Worse still, was the shared exposure of high profile spies that had worked within the
West delivering nuclear secrets to the ‘evil’ Soviet Union. The United States’

11

Rose, The Cold War Comes to Main Street: America in 1950, 2-3.
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government and its institutions invested in propaganda in order to sway citizens’ opinions
to the ‘righteous’ American cause. This came in the form of circulating pamphlets, duck
and cover drills, and even through film and television. The arts became heavily
scrutinized by the Motion Picture Association of America, HUAC, and the Hollywood
Blacklist for Communist sympathies or pro-Communist leanings. Suspected Communists
were persecuted and often unemployed. The anti-Communist hysteria was initiated by
reactionaries and alarmists. With the U.S. governments’ policy of ‘containment’ in place
by the late-1940s; containment was intended to stop the spread of communism around the
world. Recommended by Soviet expert, George F. Kennan, containment became the
official foreign policy of the United States towards the Soviet Union. In a way,
containment was also sanctioned on the home front, as Communists, ‘subversives,’ and
‘fellow travelers,’ became suspect to harsh investigation by anti-Communist
reactionaries. It seems a bit ironic that the ironclad Communist rule of Stalin purged
millions of ‘class enemies’ by death or the Gulags because they did not conform to his
idea of a pure Marxist-Leninist society. Yet, in the free United States citizens that did not
conform were outcast and subjected to intense scrutiny by investigative bodies. Though
they were not purged or sentenced to death labor camps, many lost their jobs and were
shunned by society. The ‘Red Scare’ lasted throughout the 1950s decade, as public
awareness grew over the specter of Communism throughout the world. Just a few short
years prior to containment, the Soviet Union had been the United States ally in World
War II. This was a stunning reversal in ideology and altered the dynamic in popular
culture. The United States’ reaction was unique, as anti-Communism created a binary
culture, or culture of paranoia. The dawn of the Cold War, a nuclear age, Stalin’s
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ambitions, and Cold Warrior spies would all have a profound impact upon American
popular culture.
When the United States used atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945,
they did so with the belief that the bombs would bring an end to a war that had the
potential of costing more lives. Only the United States, Great Britain, and Canada were
aware of the secret Manhattan Project, leaving their Soviet ally out of the clandestine
operation altogether. This would have grave consequences in the years to come, but as we
know, the Soviets had learned the atomic secrets despite the guarded scientific testings’
by the Western allies. Stalin was aware of the existence of the Manhattan Project even
before President Harry S. Truman.12 From 1945-1949 the Americans’ held the nuclear
monopoly, possessing the most cutting-edge form of total preventative warfare. Yet, the
United States could not use such weapons unilaterally during relative peace time. This
practically negated their supremacy of holding the nuclear monopoly in the first place.
The United States appeared to have to the upper-hand in the Cold War by way of their
atomic bombs, but Stalin knew they could, nor would use them if at all possible. A
democratic society would not stand behind such methods of warfare, nor a first-strike
scenario; a fact that Stalin knew very well. By 1949, the West presumed they were
winning the global war against Communism due to the nuclear monopoly, the Truman
Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan. Additional factors reinforced this belief when Stalin was
forced to remove his forces from Iran (a strategic oil region in the Middle East).
Furthermore, from 1948-1949 Stalin’s Berlin Blockade had failed in spectacular fashion

12

John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America, (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1999). Stalin achieved this feat through the cultivation of the Soviet spy networks he had
established in the West.
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as the West was more efficacious with their airlift initiatives. They were able to provide
supplies and provisions on a regular basis, thus nulling Stalin’s blockade in the first
place. However, by the summer of 1949 it became clear why Stalin had not protested
these events with more force. Stalin announced the first successful Soviet atomic bomb in
August 1949, via a radio address. For years Soviet scientists had been working on their
own atomic bomb in secret. This trumped Iran or the Berlin Blockade; for now both
superpowers possessed weapons of mass destruction. Once President Truman broke the
news to the American public, fears mounted over Stalin having control of nuclear
weapons of his own. First, America no longer held the atomic monopoly; the only other
option now would be a preventative first strike, which was out of the question (although
the Eisenhower Administration did consider this stance for a time). The idea of the
atomic bomb acting as deterrence no longer held as much weight now that the Soviet’s
controlled the same weapons. Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) became the new
formula of deterrence, with the idea being that both superpowers would be equally
destroyed in the event of a nuclear war. Fears escalated over whether the Cold War would
turn into a hot war, except this time with weapons of catastrophic consequences. Stalin’s
acquisition of the atomic bomb only added to the anti-Communist sentiments
proliferating at home.
Secondly, no one knew for certain how many atomic bombs Stalin had in his
nuclear arsenal or if he was willing to use them in a first strike against the United States.
Stalin was unpredictable, and worse, brutal in his rule. If he had been willing to slaughter
millions in his Purges and Gulags, then would it be that difficult for him to decimate an
American city? The lives of his own citizens mattered very little in the name of Marxist-
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Leninism and Western lives were far more expendable with their democratic values.
Fears of Stalin using the Soviets’ new weapon were widespread, adding fuel to the ‘Red
Scare’ and paranoia in the United States. Yet Stalin was cautious when it came to the
atomic bomb. He was not about to use the only weapons he had without knowing more
information about United States strengths and capabilities. In fact, he would turn around
and use his own atomic capabilities as deterrence against the U.S. because his regime was
not a democratic society. This point had baffled him, as he alone could make any
decision necessary for the Soviet Union. If Stalin wanted to use the atomic bomb, he
could, without anyone capable of stopping him. The point was that he alone controlled
the fate of the Soviet Union, while Truman had to answer to Congress, the military, and
the American citizens. Stalin saw this as a severe handicap for the United States. It also
became clear in the West that Stalin had used espionage to steal atomic secrets while in
an alliance during World War II. He had spied on the countries he was in cooperation
with, which made his betrayal much more difficult to grasp. It is hardly a secret that both
the United States and Soviet Union were cautiously suspicious of one another during
their wartime alliance.13 Each placed their differences aside in order to end Nazi fascism
across Europe. The tension these two countries felt towards one another was highly
evident during the war summits in Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam. The mistrust ran deep and
the two superpowers struggled to agree on post-war divisions of Europe. In turn, this led
to the ‘spheres of influence’ that demarcated geo-political boundaries during the Cold
War. Soviet espionage was not limited to stealing atomic secrets. It became evident in
key developments like the Alger Hiss case, Elizabeth Bentley, Whittaker Chambers, and

13

Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, (Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

Huesing 17

even the Hollywood Ten. Stalin’s acts of espionage against the United States was a
contributing factor to the prevailing suspicions in the West, as anyone could be acting as
a Soviet spy. The American public had no cultural experience with spying and sabotage,
which led to further fascination surrounding the use of espionage in the East-West
conflict.
Equally concerning was that the Communist ideology appeared to be triumphing
in places like Asia, Eastern Europe, and the ‘third world.’ In 1949, after a protracted Civil
War, China’s Communist leader Mao Zedong established the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) with Communism as their official ideology. It was unclear to the West whether
China and the Soviet Union were allies in a global Communist effort. The ‘loss’ of China
to Communism was a substantial setback to democratic efforts in developing nations
around the world.14 The sheer magnitude of Soviet and Chinese populations made
Communism more prominent than democracy, which raised alarm among the Western
allies. China would be capable of influencing all of Southeast Asia, officially throwing
support to North Korea during the Korean War with the United States. Even though it
was not immediately clear to Western leaders what role China played in the Soviet’s push
for global supremacy, Mao was showing signs that he would lead China the way he
desired. Stalin and Mao’s relations were tenuous and based only on Marxist-Leninist
principles; however that was not evident to the West at the time.15 What mattered was
that Communism was growing and now enveloped Eastern Europe and Asia. The
‘spheres of influence’ had forced Eastern Europe to fall under the dictatorship of Stalin,

14

John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1997).
15
Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev.
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with nations east of Poland all becoming a part of the U.S.S.R. The United States and
Soviet Union would compete for influence in the third world, where emerging
nationalism was taking root. The competition brought intrusions by the superpowers into
the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. The United States formulated the ‘domino
theory,’ in that if one nation fell to Communism nearby neighbors would soon follow.
They exercised their power through politics and economics in order to sway nations
towards the side of democracy. Likewise, the Soviet Union was practicing the same
methodologies in order to spread Communism across the globe. The rivalry between
democracy and Communism continued to have an insidious influence over the state of
the world for the next four decades.
Furthermore, by 1949 the United States and Soviet Union embarked upon a
nuclear arms race that would last throughout the Cold War. On the loss of the nuclear
monopoly, historian Paul Boyer stated it, “accelerated the shift towards viewing the bomb
not as a terrible scourge to be eliminated as quickly as possible, but as a winning weapon
to be stockpiled with the utmost urgency.”16 Stalin’s victory with the Soviet atomic bomb
was not to last long.
In 1952, the United States government, military, Defense Department, and
Atomic Energy Commission successfully detonated the far more destructive hydrogen
bomb, or super bomb, on the Eniwetok atoll in the Marshall Islands. This acceleration of
advancing thermonuclear weapons was approximated to be one thousand times more

16

Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age.
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powerful than the atomic bombs dropped on Japan in 1945.17 The test, part of Operation
Ivy was codenamed ‘Mike’ and occurred on November 1, 1952 on the smaller island
Elugelab.18 The blast was three miles wide, reaching 120,000 feet with a mushroom cloud
that spread across 100 miles.19 The island was completely obliterated, leaving behind a
crater that was 6,240 feet across and 164 feet deep.20 The hydrogen bomb proved far
more formidable than any previous weapons. When citizens learned of the magnitude of
destruction the H-bomb could bring, it severely altered the dynamic of living in a nuclear
age. Just a year later the Soviets began testing their own hydrogen bombs, once again
leveling the playing field between the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms race. As the nuclear
race intensified between the two superpowers, the anti-Communist crusade in America
reached an unprecedented level. The impact of the arms race cannot be understated, for it
had a powerful impact on influencing and shaping American popular culture during the
1950s.
Espionage became another avenue of interest, especially during the 1950s. With
the use of espionage on the rise, politicians began looking internally for anyone who
might be a Communist, or sympathetic to the Communist cause. As high profile spy
cases, such as Alger Hiss, Klaus Fuchs, and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg came to light,
both the public and private sphere began to fear that anyone could be acting as a Soviet
spy. Furthermore, the fact that Stalin had achieved his atomic weapons through stolen
intelligence only fueled the desire to eradicate Communism from American soil. The
17

Joanne Lamm, “The Island is Missing!” U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center. October, 28 2010.
(Accessed 10 December, 2015). www.m.army.m.
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anti-Communist crusaders could now utilize the Soviet spies as evidence to sway public
opinion towards their ‘righteous’ cause.21 Alger Hiss had worked for the United States
government in the State Department. He was implicated by former Communist Party
member Whittaker Chambers. Although Hiss denied his involvement with the Soviets,
and the statute of limitations had expired for further repercussions, Hiss was still
convicted of perjury in 1953 and served in prison for three years.22 Hiss was tried by the
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), originally established to combat
Nazism. By the 1950s, HUAC became a driving force in the anti-Communist crusade.
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were implicated by Ethel’s brother, David Greenglass,
and were brought to trial in 1953. Greenglass plead down, receiving a fifteen year
sentence in prison for being a courier to Julius at Los Alamos where the atomic bomb
was created. Greenglass’ sentence appeared extreme, but it was nothing compared to
Julius and Ethel’s fate. Both Rosenbergs refused to plead guilty and were sentenced to
death for conspiracy to commit espionage. The resulting sentences were shocking indeed
and harsh considering the amount of evidence.23 However, the spy trials were just another
symptom of how desperate the ‘Red Scare’ stigma had become during the early 1950s. If
the Rosenbergs were able to appear as average citizens, but were truly Soviet moles, than
whom else could be covertly operating for the Soviet Union? How deep had the
Communists penetrated the United States? These were just some of the questions that
politicians and anti-Communist activists confronted during the ‘Red Scare’ period.
21

Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America---the Stalin
Era, (New York: Random House, 1999).
22
G. Edward White, Alger Hiss’s Looking-Glass Wars: The Covert Life of a Soviet Spy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004).
23
Lori Clune, Executing the Rosenbergs: Death and Diplomacy in a Cold War World (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016).
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Equally alarming, regular citizens of the Communist Party in America became a serious
threat because of their ‘allegiance’ to Marxist-Leninist doctrine; although there was never
substantial proof that any of them posed a real threat in the first place. Even if they were
not a Soviet spy they were perceived as undesirable persons, which became a dangerous
slope between the public and private sphere. Anti-Communist advocates (many
conservative politicians) wanted to protect the purity of American principles and values.
They beheld Communism as the most imminent threat to American security, both foreign
and domestic. The slippery slope between public and private spheres led to interferences
by HUAC, the FBI, and most importantly, the trials of Senator Joseph McCarthy. These
impediments resulted in stripping many American’s of their First Amendment rights and
freedoms. America, by the early 1950s, in some way had come to resemble the very
society it openly opposed.24
Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy [R-WI] spearheaded the Communist trials
of government officials, businessmen, Hollywood celebrities, teachers, unionists, and
even the United States military. McCarthyism became a term for the 1950s trials that
were synonymous with the anti-Communist crusade, even gaining ill repute as the witchhunt campaign. McCarthy went after any left-leaning citizens, or anyone suspected of
Communism or Communist sympathy. McCarthyism became so ubiquitous; it was as if
the Senator was running his own totalitarian regime.25 The cost of the trials meant being
blacklisted; or possibly even unemployment.26 The trials marginalized the civil rights of
citizens, combining the public and private spheres in the politicization of popular
24
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culture.27 Historian Stephen J. Whitfield stated, “But when such a standard becomes
pervasive and intensive, and so potent in its effects that countless careers are ruined and
the public cannot make its own choices in the marketplace of ideas, then the United
States has come to resemble, rather uncomfortably, the sort of society to which it wishes
to be contrasted with.”28 McCarthyism began to call into question the patriotism of those
it was seeking to condemn. In a sense, McCarthy and his adherents based their reason and
logic upon their own authority and not the will of the people. They searched for
convictions based upon their own concepts of American principles and values.29
Whitfield also stated:
…anti-Communism was so intensified on American soil…With the source of evil so
elusive and so immune to risk-free retaliation, American culture was politicized. The
values and perceptions, the forms of expression, the symbolic patterns, the beliefs and
myths that enabled Americans to make sense of reality---these constituents of culture
were contaminated by an unseemly political interest in their roots and consequences.30

Senator Joseph McCarthy died in 1957 and eventually his Communist ‘witch hunt’ came
to an end. However, much of the damage was already done---he had brought definition to
the anti-Communist cause with his tactics of repression---politicizing popular culture in a
way unlike any previous decade.
As popular forms of entertainment, film and television soon began to reflect the
themes of anti-Communism. This was not all together due to a rallying cry against the
‘red’ menace; nor was majority of citizens following along with the hysteria and paranoia
that pervaded culture. HUAC and other committees, including the FBI, sought to
27
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suppress subversive art if it did not conform to American ‘decency’ and morals.31 This
affected numerous major motion pictures and television programs released during the
1950s. A wide variety of films released in this period reflected the themes of antiCommunism, subversion, espionage, and trust in the government as society’s faithful
defenders. American filmmakers used the Cold War as a backdrop, sometimes through
alien invasions, spying, or nuclear warnings. During this period, themes of ‘good’ versus
‘evil’ equated to the Americans versus the Communists. It was black and white, with no
grey expanses in the middle. Cinema and television became unconsciously tools of
propaganda used in the anti-Communist movement during the 1950s. Through influence,
these mediums of entertainment could reinforce American values while subliminally
warning of the dangers in Communist ideology. During the early years of the Cold War,
the production of nearly seventy films had explicit anti-Communist themes.32 While
majority of American’s simply carried on with their daily lives---not necessarily caught
up in the ‘red’ hysteria--- the sheer volume of propaganda thrust into their faces speaks
considerably for the political agenda within popular culture.
Some of the films produced during this period were intended to sway public
opinion; to reinforce American core values. The conservative climate and the suppression
of left-leaning ideologies became reflected in forms of entertainment as a means to gather
support and expel the anti-Communist threat. Although most early Cold War films were
not wildly popular; the goal was to influence peoples’ social beliefs and values. The
resulting effect was conformity to the status quo. HUAC and the FBI both became
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involved in censoring Hollywood films to ensure the proper message was being
conveyed.33 The ‘Red Scare’ was already rampant, thus projecting themes of a
Communist infiltration could only bolster further support for the cause. Sometimes the
Communist themes were hidden beneath symbolic layers; other times they were a direct
reference to the conflict through fictional backdrops. A recurring theme was to pit the
United States against the Soviet Union, thus creating the image of one side as ‘good,’
while the other as ‘evil.’ Filmmakers were not alone in using American cinema as a
battleground of the Cold War. It should be noted that some filmmakers had no other
choice or they faced the repercussions of McCarthyism, HUAC, or the FBI.34 Several
conservative groups such as the United States Catholic Legion of Decency and the
Production Code Administration became involved to ensure proper anti-Communist
themes were present in American films. During the 1950s, HUAC and the Motion Picture
Association of America became notorious for its Hollywood ‘Blacklist.’ This list
consisted of screenwriters, producers, directors, actors, and actresses. Anyone associated
with the production of a film that was suspected as Communists or sympathizers were
included on the infamous blacklist. Many found themselves subject to the McCarthy
trials and countless careers were ruined simply because of ‘suspicion.’ The blacklist and
trials tarnished reputations, further impeding American civil liberties.35 The Communist
paranoia had reached a fever-pitch and undoubtedly contaminated what films were made;
it is impossible to know for certain what films Americans’ missed out on due to the
indirect suppression of the arts.
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The Motion Picture Alliance for the Preservation of Ideals invited HUAC into
Hollywood in 1947.36 The organization took on the prototypical stance of fighting the
spread of Communism in America. They asserted that “coexistence is a myth and
neutrality is impossible…anyone who is not FIGHTING Communism is HELPING
Communism.”37 Fifteen hundred members including John Wayne, Gary Cooper, Walt
Disney, and Cecil B. De Mille (among many other noteworthy names) were a part of the
Motion Picture Alliance.38 The overzealous patriotism that seized anti-Communist
Hollywood filmmakers and stars contributed to the volumes of movies made that
reinforced American idealism and conformity. When it came to censoring motion
pictures during the early-1950s, “HUAC…sensed a marvelous opportunity for publicity
and accepted the alliance’s invitation to expose cinematic Communism.”39 But in the
early years of such oppression on Hollywood not everyone was on board with HUAC’s
agenda. Whitfield stated, “A Gallup poll showed that 36 percent of Americans queried
were against the film industry investigations, and 37 percent were for them.”40 Yet, it was
also clear that Hollywood had become the new battleground of the Cold War. It was a
way to assert American ideology, while trying to utilize a popular medium to express it.
Despite HUAC and the Major Motion Picture Alliance’s efforts to find devious
Communist content in American films, even supporters of their cause held serious
misgivings. Surprisingly, Ronald Reagan, the future President that helped end the Cold
War in the 1980s stated to HUAC, “I do not believe the Communists have ever at any
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time been able to use the motion picture screen as a sounding board for their philosophy
or their ideology.”41
Ayn Rand took a completely different stance than Reagan over how Communism
was affecting Hollywood. She published a pamphlet entitled Screen Guide for Americans
in 1950, lending advice over cinematic development. She stated, “[t]he purpose of the
Communists in Hollywood is not the production of political movies openly advocating
Communism. Their purpose is to corrupt our moral premises by corrupting non-political
movies…making people absorb the basic principles of Collectivism by indirection and
implication.”42 Clearly there were some people who took the Communist threat a bit too
sincerely. There was never any solid evidence proving that there was a real attempt at an
orchestrated Communist infiltration in film, television, or even among society.
Regardless of who was for or against the interferences with the production of films, it
was clearly evident that the politicization of culture would have an enduring impact on
Hollywood in the 1950s.
In the late-1940s several films were released with anti-Communist political
implications. Examples are The Iron Curtain in 1948; The Red Menace in 1949; and the
Red Danube in 1949.43 According to Whitfield, “The election year of 1952 was the peak,
when twelve explicitly anti-Communist films were produced.44 I Was A Communist for
the FBI “promotes distrust of the Bill of Rights, suggesting that a desire to strengthen it
emanates from the Kremlin, which is campaigning to torpedo the authority of HUAC.”45
41
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One can hardly deny the irony such films presented; yet these overt films were still
considered box office bombs. Citizens were not keen on having such blatant ideological
messages thrust into their faces in the form of entertainment. The most ardent film
released was My Son John in 1953. Whitfield also stated, “The film that most feverishly
reflected the political traumas of the Cold War was My Son John (1952). Indeed, if it did
not exist, students of Red Scare movies would have been compelled to invent it.”46 The
plot of the film revolves around a Catholic family who suspects their son as a Communist
spy. John, the spy, lies to his family, swears by his religion, and is ultimately discovered,
facing an FBI interrogation. He returns to his life as a spy, but finally decides he is going
to give a full confession. In the end he is killed by Communist agents before he was able
to give his confession. On the so-called achievement of the film (which is not a feat to
celebrate), Whitfield added, “Since the movies of the era were not permitted to locate the
motivations for turning towards Communism in economic or social conditions, since
themes of class and race, injustice, and impoverishment contradicted the complacent
ideology of the 1950s, My Son John pursued the logical consequences of the only
dramatically plausible alternative.”47 The film sought to explore how Communism could
disintegrate the American family and its values. Any overt means of why one would turn
to Communism was not permitted at the time; that was part of the censorship process.
Regardless, the movie was pivotal as a study case in the early-1950s anti-Communist
crusade.
Other films began to reflect the Communist threat through symbolism. For
instance, Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956) was about giant alien seed pods in a
46
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California town that were slowly replacing people in society. Obviously not an overt or
political film about a Communist takeover, the main concept was human susceptibility to
brainwashing. And was not Communist ideology considered brainwashing? The film
intended to scare audiences and was quite successful at the time, becoming a cult classic
movie. Of course the plot is outrageous with aliens overtaking an entire town while
citizens slept safely in their beds at night, but it worked in its subliminal messages of a
mass takeover; one that in reality could be Communism (according to HUAC and other
conservative groups). The progression of films during the 1950s and the involvement of
committees’ and institutions in the production and censoring process prove that the Cold
War had made an impact on American popular culture. From films with political agendas
to films that were absolutely fantastical, the 1950s was consumed by the ‘red’ specter.
The politicization of culture was also a means to maintain the status quo, to keep with
convention and conformity. Trusting the government, along with its institutions and
bureaucracies was a way to prevent dissent from the ‘idealistic’ and ‘self-sacrificing’
front that had been established by governing authorities. It was not just about preventing
the spread of Communism; it was to maintain the persona of Americanism in the face of
adversity. The problem was that these ideals were based on the government’s idea of the
‘proper’ way, with little deviation from that status. Citizens were taught not to worry, by
way of influence, because the government and military were designed to protect the
people; if not altogether ‘fix’ any elements that appeared broken. These pre-Cultural
Détente attitudes were conditioned by applying lessons of the past---that the government
and its institutions were a trustworthy cause. By the end of the decade the antiCommunist fever began to fade. Moviegoers and readers began to draw into question the
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conformity that had been so strictly projected upon them throughout the 1950’s. The
relationship between citizen and state became strained, as citizens searched for new
identities in the 1960s and violations by the West, or their own ideals, became better
known.
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Chapter 2
David John Moore Cornwell, better known as John le Carré, became the preeminent spy fiction author of the 20th century. In many respects le Carré was a
traditionalist, paying homage to such authors as Graham Greene and Joseph Conrad.
However, le Carré used the moral and ethical dilemmas of Western involvement in the
Cold War as the foundation for his narratives of intrigue; making his novels essential
exposés of current events. He broke from early-Cold War conformities by developing
critiques outside of the status quo. By the 1960s, le Carré saw very little distinction
between Eastern and Western objectives in the war. Defending liberal democracy brought
the same means to an end; with individuals exploited in the name of advancing progress.
Not only did these bold ideas increase his popularity among audiences, they also paved
the way for le Carré to become the leading voice for Cultural Détente. As we know,
détente was used as a means of relieving geo-political tensions between the United States
and Soviet Union during the 1970s; yet by the beginning of the 1960s, attitudes began to
shift towards the U.S. (Western) government due to its cynicism, hypocrisy and shortsightedness.48 The strict anti-Communism of the 1950s and the pressures to conform to
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American idealisms left the public feeling profoundly jaded. It also signified that the
Western public was beginning to embrace a relaxation of tensions long before a political
one was even on the horizon. In anticipating, or foretelling the atmosphere of change,
John le Carré wrote what he knew best. He knew the genre was more popular in
mainstream culture than ever before. What made his narratives of intrigue a thoughtprovoking historical lens through which to view 1960-1965 popular culture was his
commitment to writing authentic and realistic spy fiction stories. He had a clear vision of
the failures in Western democracies. Their virtues were to uphold and protect the moral
and ethical principles of freedom and liberty. Le Carré regarded this as the great paradox
of the Cold War. Often, he did not perceive much difference between Eastern and
Western methods in espionage; where the excesses of governments, bureaucracies, and
institutions were willing to use any means to an end. Inevitably this would impact
popular culture and transform the way citizens reacted to the East-West conflict. With
this in mind, John le Carré began his highly successful career, while utilizing his artistic
medium as a means to express alternative views of the Cold War and the relationship of
citizen to state in the West.
Cold War policies, like the ‘rollback’ of the 1950s began to dissipate by the end
of the decade. The McCarthy trials had turned into a spectacle and crusade, consistently
losing credibility while staining the perception of an American Communist threat. The
over-embellished fears of a Communist infiltration also seemed far too implausible for
serious consideration. Even the threat of a nuclear war began to dissipate, especially after
the death of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin in 1953. The Americans and Soviets were still
deeply enmeshed in the nuclear arms race; but the new Soviet Premier, Nikita
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Khrushchev appeared far less menacing than the brutality of Stalin’s regime. However,
the United States and the Soviets nevertheless persisted in the game for global
predominance. Intelligence gathering through espionage or ‘spying’ continued to thrive
in both the East and West. The more spies became exposed to the public, the more
fascinated the public became with the esoteric and clandestine world. One of the only
means to satisfy their piqued curiosity was through spy fiction narratives. By 1960, the
Cold War was far from simmering down. Many events and scandals that occurred in the
1960s only increased tensions between the United States and Soviet Union. What was
changing was how the public began reacting to such events and how they began to
understand them.
John le Carré recognized the significance of the moment, as he was also a
political author as well. He thinly veiled his political analyses throughout his narratives of
intrigue. Tony Barley stated, “while on an altogether different plane; there is le Carré the
political novelist, dramatizer and analyst of opponent positions, commentator on the
practices of the Cold War, and historian of diverse crises…”49 He is considered a moral
satirist, a man of conscience, a knowing insider, an ironist, and a myth-maker.50 He wrote
about ideologies, cynicism, Eastern and Western methodologies, and relied heavily upon
symbolism and imagery. His most acclaimed attribute was his commitment to realism;
for this characteristic is what set him apart from fellow British and American espionage
authors. Le Carré’s attributes as a writer made him a strong leader in analyzing the
Western ‘thaw’ because he was able to both internalize and externalize the predominant
issues that plagued governments, bureaucracies, and even intelligence communities. He
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analyzed the psychological; the harsh paradoxes of the Cold War. During a 1977
interview with Time, le Carré stated, “I brought back, but did not invent, the realistic spy
story.”51 This statement is interesting because it demonstrates a conscious choice to write
novels that appeared so real, they could easily leave readers pondering over how much
truth was revealed about intelligence, governments, and the Cold War. There remains
little doubt that le Carré was in the right place at the right time, serving up tales of
intrigue that struck a nerve and negated the earlier Manichean narratives in Cold War
popular culture. He achieved this feat by critiquing the cynicism and hypocrisy of overprotected Western governments that relied upon methods of influence in order to
maintain liberal democracy.
Classified as detective fiction, Le Carré published his first two novels, Call For
the Dead in 1961 and A Murder of Quality in 1962. Nonetheless, both novels employ
some use of espionage. Already in these two narratives, le Carré highlights what would
become his analysis: the cynicism, careerism, and impotence in Western governments,
bureaucracies, and institutions. Both of le Carré’s works introduce his most famous
protagonist George Smiley. Smiley further appeared in many of le Carré’s Cold War
novels, both working sometimes for British Intelligence and sometimes completely on his
own. As a character Smiley makes for an interesting case study over how le Carré sought
to express ‘realistic’ spies. It is important to note that le Carré had worked for the British
Intelligence Services from the 1950s-1960s. He officially retired from MI6 in 1964 in
order to focus on his writing career. This provides a basis for his commitment to realism,
while also giving him credible experience in the world of intelligence. Unlike many other
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literary spies, most arguably Ian Fleming’s ‘James Bond,’ le Carré’s George Smiley was
almost an anti-heroic figure. His methods relied upon intuition, pragmatism, and the
power of deduction. In this regard, Smiley became relatable to the reading audience.
While Ian Fleming’s tales grew more fantastical and outrageous, le Carré’s Smiley was
always practiced and methodical. Smiley, as in all of le Carré’s characters, is not the
ultimate focus of this historical interpretation of le Carré’s significance. Instead, Smiley
and others are analyzed as a conduit of le Carré’s creative and intellectual process.
Through his characters experiences he was able to critique the moral and ethical
dilemmas caused by the Cold War. Le Carré looked not only to the East and Communists
as the enemies of Western governments. In fact, he used varying scenarios with a
multitude of characters for the primary purpose of reinventing the very definition of
‘enemies.’ Le Carré possessed all of the right attributes as a leader in Cultural Détente.
Clearly the prominence of his message was well regarded by society because it brought to
light the predicaments of Western practices in the Cold War. He disregarded the
governments’ supercilious claims of upholding the virtues of democracy, when the
lessons of the 1950s revealed a much different picture. The Iranian coup d’état; the
Guatemalan coup d’état; the Hungarian Revolution; the Suez Crisis and the oppression of
the private sphere through censorship all clearly demonstrated that the governing powers
claimed one thing while implementing another. For le Carré, these actions, coupled with
severe mistrust, were essential to his critiques developed in his spy fiction narratives.
By the time le Carré published his first two spy narratives the Cold War had
become quite active. In the background always stood the clash of democracy and
Communism, along with the nuclear arms race; but a series of global crises from the late-
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1950s to the mid-1960s intensified the East-West conflict. The fall of 1956 brought
tensions into the Middle East and Hungary. In late October, Great Britain, Israel, and
France invaded the Suez Canal in Egypt in a disastrous effort to regain Western control
over the region. For Great Britain, the Suez campaign was backward-looking by
imposing World War II methods in the contemporary war. The result was a humiliating
failure for the fading Empire, with increased anxiety over the severe reproach from the
United States, United Nations, and Soviet Union. The purpose of the campaign was to
remove Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s power; however Western efforts only
increased his hold over the strategic region.52
Around the exact same time as the Suez Crisis, tempers began to flare in Hungary
as student movements cried out for a revolution against the Soviet Union. They gathered
enough momentum, even encouragement from the West and an uprising ensued between
the Hungarian revolutionaries and the Hungarian’s People Republic (backed by the
Soviet Union). The United States, Great Britain, and France encouraged the uprising in
the hope that Eastern European countries would break free from the Eastern bloc and
Warsaw Pact. Yet, no intervention was conducted due to the cynicism of the West, along
with the greater threat of a direct U.S.-Soviet war. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
had spoken about the “rollback” and it certainly encouraged many Hungarians to believe
that the United States would provide assistance in some form, even though many did not
consider it would be through military intervention.53 However, despite Dulles and
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Eisenhower’s claims, the risk of nuclear war amplified the situation and prevented either
superpower from overstepping certain geo-political boundaries. The uprising was crushed
by the Soviets, leaving an estimated 3,000 casualties and 13,000 wounded, along with
refugees and ex-Communists. The Hungarian Revolution is significant because it
demonstrated that even citizens in the East were attempting to alter current
circumstances. Student movements in the United States, Great Britain, Poland, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union all instigated reformist approaches to
contemporary day problems. In the Soviet Union, Khrushchev’s ‘Thaw’ and campaign of
‘peaceful coexistence’ with the West promulgated de-Stalinization and the rise of dissent
against the strict policies of the socialist system. In the United States and Great Britain,
reformists took on anti-government sentiments, unwilling to blindly follow the
governments’ protocols without question. Citizens necessitated reform through civil
liberties: African-American equality, female rights, and changes from previous
Conservative politics. In Great Britain, equivalent attitudes were mounting amid an
analogous, innovative Cold War generation. During periods of economic crisis and high
unemployment the British government used Cold War propaganda to divert average
citizens from the real internal problems.54 Domestic turmoil was mounting in the United
States and Soviet Union at the same time; here, too, politicians commonly used
propaganda as a political tool for diversion. If the Hungarian Revolution proved anything
it was that there was a growing power within student and intellectual movements that
incited change where necessary.
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The beginning of the 1960s also brought new crises to the Cold War. In 1961, the
Soviet Union began construction on the Berlin Wall, which would divide East and West
Germany (and Europe) for the next twenty-eight years. Also in 1961, the United States
launched the covert operation against Cuba in the Bay of Pigs Invasion. The intent was to
overthrow Fidel Castro’s pro-Communist regime; however the invasion failed
spectacularly in a humiliating defeat. The pinnacle moment of the Cold War came in
1962 when the United States and Soviet Union became gridlocked in the Cuban Missile
Crisis. For thirteen days the two superpowers came to the closest either side had ever
been in a nuclear faceoff. After the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy refused to back down
or show any weakness towards the Soviets. He called for a naval blockade near Cuba that
would force Soviet ships to stop from passing without repercussions. In the end,
President Kennedy called Premier Khrushchev’s nuclear brinkmanship, preventing a
global disaster. Although the two superpowers continued to fight the Cold War, the most
imminent threat seemed to have been averted. These series of crises are critical in
understanding how and why the public’s perception of the war began to evolve. The years
of accepting political interferences within popular culture, as it had been during the
1950s, were now suspect to a plague of questions and doubts.55
Le Carré’s perception of the transformations taking shape in popular culture was
exhibited through his characters and plotlines. Le Carré stated, “I had to choose the world
of spies because it illustrates what I had to say: the solitude of the designated victim.”56
The world of intelligence during the Cold War was a hotbed of activity, thus giving the
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author the perfect outlet for his messages. For him, the clandestine world was not a
glamorous one; real spies were filled with conflict over moral obligations and duty; over
dealing with an ever-expanding world of confused ideologies. During an interview with
Michael Dean in 1974 he stated, “…I wrote about the things that I knew of, the tensions
in Berlin which I witnessed: institutional behavior, British nostalgia for power, perhaps,
and I imported from my experience of the Foreign Service a great deal of the way paper
is moved around and the dinginess of decisions, sometimes.”57 Part of le Carré’s creative
process was to draw upon a myriad of characters and plotlines in order to critique
political, social, and ideological Cold War issues. Wrapped in the world of intelligence,
he was capable of highlighting these changes by grounding them in reality. Author Peter
Lewis wrote, “One of le Carré’s points is that in the real world, unlike that of fictional
romance, inconspicuous, drab, cautious nobodies make vastly superior spies to
swashbuckling adventurers, who would not last long. Spying is, after all, a lonely,
undramatic, unexciting, routine job for the most part, best left to the unassuming and selfeffacing.”58 The point is that spying was not always a righteous cause; it could also be
lonely and isolating and this was part of the harsh Cold War reality.
What appears to be unattractive in fictional spy stories actually turned out to be a
huge success because the plights and conditions were relatable. Le Carré’s spy ‘heroes’
were not exempt from the pitiable state of the Cold War. Thus, his messages became
more important in context to a cultural ‘thaw.’ Le Carré’s use of his artistic medium
(1961-1964) opened up channels for broader discussions about the costs of the Cold War.
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Soon, other artists, activists, and average citizens of all varieties developed new
interpretations of East and West relations. By the late-1960s the New Left and
Counterculture Movements called for political and social reforms. In the span of one
decade, the United States moved from strict censorship and McCarthyism to a complete
reversal of such policies. Cultural Détente bridged the gap between the anti-Communist
phobia in the 1950s to the rise of the New Left and Counterculture in the 1960s. There is
ample evidence for the ‘thaw’ in popular culture and John le Carré was one creative
leader that helped facilitate this change.
Many of the thematic devices le Carré used opened up avenues of further
exploration. For example, in his first novel Call For the Dead, his ‘enemy’ comes as a
stunning revelation.59 Revolved around the death of a Foreign Office Civil Servant,
Samuel Fennan, George Smiley is set with the task of uncovering who is the actual
murderer. Smiley eventually uncovers the secretive life of Fennan’s wife Elsa. Elsa was a
secretive Communist controlled by an East German spy named Mundt. She framed her
husband and ultimately sacrificed him for the sake of her ideology.60 While the story
appears the standard stuff of detective and spy fiction, its greatness lies within the layers
of meaning. Considering that alien invasions and mindless brainwashing had been
59
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popular means to express a Communist takeover, le Carré’s rendition took on a more
intimate, yet frightful undertone. The fact that a wife would be willing to betray, frame,
and sacrifice her own husband for the sake of ideology seemed both plausible and
realistic in the complex clash of ideologies. In this way, le Carré was casting off
traditional notions of ‘good’ and ‘evil;’ which was exactly the problem in rationalizing
the Cold War. The ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality was changing and expanding. The
traditional means of justifications were becoming more complicated as the war moved
on. Le Carré was making a point that holding onto traditionalist thinking was becoming
obsolete.
Le Carré was also highly critical of the politics involved in the Cold War.
Political elements run throughout all four of his early novels; whether in the form of
bureaucratic power, expansive institutions, divided class systems, British-American
relations, and even the substructures of intelligence communities themselves. He drew
criticism upon the British elite-school systems (as is the main focus in A Murder of
Quality), the ‘Circus’ (his fictional Intelligence Agency), East and West relations, and the
substructures of intelligence communities. Most importantly le Carré critiqued the
‘Establishment;’ the expansive governing bodies that exercised influence over average
peoples’ daily lives. Across years of interviews with John le Carré he often mentioned
these issues as deep concern for him, both as an artist and a citizen. As expected, most
authors write from experiences and often reflect their own worldviews within their
narratives. Le Carré is no exception here and has been quite vocal in his opinions. A
distinction of Cultural Détente was the increasing mistrust of Western governments and
its institutions. The term ‘the Establishment,’ a slang term for government, was first used
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in the public domain by a Henry Fairlie article in The Spectator in 1955.61 Author Tony
Barley stated that the term, “quickly came to denote the unofficial, conspiratorial powerelite which exercised insidious social influence.”62 In regards to le Carré and the
‘Establishment,’ Barley further stated, “It is a notion that has remained with le Carré
throughout his career. The Establishment, for him, symbolizes the state not the nation; it
pretends to act in the interests of all but is acutely accountable to no one below and really
serves itself.”63 Anti-Establishment feelings soon spread in student movements and
intellectual circles across the globe. Many, including le Carré, began to take on the antiEstablishment attitude; that the powerful elite did not serve the best interests of the
people, but rather its own agenda. The term was not limited in reference to strictly antigovernment sentiments; it was also applicable towards any power, bureaucracy, or
institution that maintained considerable influence upon society. Le Carré generally
applied the term in the same capacity. During a 1974 interview with Robert D.
Deindorfer, le Carré was asked if his “view of the world was as sour as it sounds.”64
Taking into consideration le Carré’s opinions on being anti-Establishment, in addition to
his views of Western government excesses and extremes, he responded, “I think it’s
fairly bleak. We consistently create institutions which are much worse than the sum of
our parts.”65 Given that le Carré was not alone, we begin to understand how the growth of
these attitudes contributed to Cultural Détente. The anti-Establishment and severe
mistrust of the government and its institutions grew in both Great Britain and the United
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States. An example of where this disdain was most evident among Americans was within
the great dissent over the war in Vietnam. The public did not see why the government--designed to protect American values and citizens---was sending their boys and men into a
foreign jungle to fight and die. The result was the burning of draft cards, draft dodgers,
and massive protests. The Vietnam War is but one example of how different public
opinion became within a small period of time.
Le Carré felt strongly about the paradoxes of the Cold War and openly spoke
about the problems facing Western culture and politics. These issues were far too
important to ignore, as he integrated them into majority of his narratives of intrigue.
Reading his work in the post-Cold War era serves as a form of historical inquiry. By
utilizing the war as his landscape and including the political, social, and ethical dilemmas
of the time, his spy fiction appears as historical time capsules. Understandably le Carré
grasped how significant these dilemmas would have in the context of the Cold War. Their
enduring memory would help to reemphasize the crises that faced a Cold War culture for
a future generation of readers. During a 1966 interview with Leigh Crutchley, le Carré
spoke boldly about the present problems facing an advancing global world. He stated:
We have always argued that in the West we may be amorphous, we may be vague may
contain a great variety of beliefs, but one thing we have in common in a non-communist
world is to be the belief that the individual is worth more than the idea: that whatever we
believe in, we will defend to the death the individual’s right to dissent; and yet in the
Cold War, and particularly the spy world which is after all the battlefield of the Cold
War, we are doing something in fact which I believe we are already doing in principle
elsewhere---that is to say, we are sacrificing the individual in our battle against the
collective. This is the supreme paradox. I want people when they open my book to begin
reading and feel “God, this could be me!” When they are reading this other type of heroic
book, I think they are saying “Oh, gosh, I wish this was me,” and that is a sharp
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difference. Both may be, in long-haired terms, pop art, but I believe that mine at the
moment has more application to our dilemma than the other.66

Le Carré gives a powerful and symbolic message concerning the Western predicament in
the war and how the issues became projected upon mainstream popular culture. First, he
criticized Western methods of warfare, claiming that they were not different from their
Eastern ‘enemies.’ Secondly, he rightly asserted that the world of espionage was the
frontlines of battle and that was where individuals were easily disposable in the name of
sacrifice to the greater good. Third, he acknowledges that his version of the Western
dilemma was more applicable than others because he was willing to challenge the status
quo. This was a very important distinction in le Carré’s work versus other spy fiction
authors like Ian Fleming. What became unique to his situation as a popular spy fiction
author was that his reading audience was likewise ready to embrace new interpretations
on the war. Films, television, and literature quickly began to satirize, critique, and
condemn earlier U.S. and British policies.
Le Carré mirrored these attitudes in his own personal mistrust of the
Establishment, even sometimes satirizing elements of the conflict. Barley stated,
“Ostensibly society’s defender, the Establishment in fact defends itself. Undeniably, the
image of the self-serving, self-deluding, factional, uncontrollable Authority exposes
something of a contradiction in the concept of a free, British (Western) democracy and
objectively represents a partially valid picture of that democracy’s actual structure. But
what are its ideological functions?”67 These questions plagued Cold War popular culture
and correlated with the growing disdain of hardline government policies. In 1963, the
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same year as the publication of le Carré’s breakout hit, The Spy Who Came in From the
Cold, the United States and Soviet Union signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In
effect on October 10, 1963, the Treaty signified momentous change that had been
advocated for by politicians, activists, and average citizens. The Treaty limited above
ground nuclear testings’ in both the United States and Soviet Union. It marked a turning
point in the nuclear arms race, although it did not diminish it. What it does signify was
that American’s were no longer willing to submit to government policies without having
a voice. During the 1950s, nuclear fallout shelters were promoted, duck and cover drills
were practiced, and pamphlets with instructions in the event of a nuclear war were widely
distributed among the public. There was a tremendous amount of nuclear propaganda
aimed at capturing American minds. Yet the costs of nuclear fallout from testing sites
were hardly ever questioned. As the Cold War escalated and the U.S. continued to
expand its nuclear arsenal, the public grew more suspicious about accepting government
nuclear policies. Transformation was inevitable, especially with so many citizens now
outright demanding it. The Test Ban Treaty was a catalyst of that change; one that would
continue to propagate and extend throughout the 1960s. The Treaty was also a substantial
moment for Cultural Détente. It proves that inspired change within Cold War politics was
germinating from expressions in popular culture. Change was moving from the bottom
up, pushing for the ‘thaw’ from earlier policies.
Le Carré seized these changes and took the world by storm with his third novel,
The Spy Who Came in From the Cold in 1963.68 Cold War spying was not about
fantastical enemies, technological gadgetry, fast cars, and women. Instead, it was the
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private nature of lonely spies subjected to the realities of paper pushing bureaucracies.
The Spy---as will be shortened for brevity’s sake---took on a brand new outlook over the
intelligence world in the Cold War. As was his style, le Carré employed groundbreaking
themes that opened up new dialogue over the nature of the clandestine communities. He
did not merely attribute Communism as the only ‘bad’ or ‘evil’ that existed in the fight
between the East and West. He presented a Western spy who was in conflict with
himself, his intelligence community, and the moral and ethical principles of Eastern and
Western methods of fighting the Cold War. Le Carré suggested that oftentimes these
methods were not very different from one another. The Western world, led by the
powerful United States, sought to provide liberty and freedom for all. The foundations of
Western values, as opposed to Communist ideals in socialism, were to never forsake the
individual above the collective. Every life is worth defending in the name of democracy
and freedom. Communism was the polar opposite to democratic ideals and values. The
individual could be sacrificed in the name of the collective good. In order to achieve the
socialist utopia all means to an end would be pursued if it served the higher purpose of
progress. This was how Stalin justified the murders of hundreds of thousands during the
Purges; finding a means to dispose of the anti-bourgeoisie or anyone who appeared
counter-revolutionary within the Eastern bloc. The advancement of socialism was the top
priority for the U.S.S.R.69 Therefore, in the Cold War, one side sought to protect the
individual, while the other could cast one aside for the greater good of the whole. In
theory this was how the two superpowers were differentiated in the complex ideological
war. However, by the early 1960s le Carré recognized that this was a mere façade of the
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truth. Reality was more obscure and blurred the lines of moral and ethical ‘right’ and
‘wrong.’ The Western world was far from stainless in their implementations of protecting
liberal democracy across the world. During a 1974 interview le Carré spoke about his
beliefs over intelligence and the current state of the Cold War. “One tragedy of our
present age is that we have been forced into a position where we have to adopt the
methods of our aggressors. There seems no way around this. But it does raise the
question of how long we can go on defending ourselves by these methods and remain a
society worth defending.”70 He asserted that Western governments were attempting to
bring about global change through democracy, but the avenues of progress had become
obscured in a “world of confused ideologies.”71 What appeared just and righteous had
become subject to opinion based upon point of view. The West searched for “our identity
in history and the justification of power.”72 For le Carré these were issues that both
citizens and governments had to come to terms with, stepping out from denial.
By the 1960s it was apparent that both sides of the war had their own internal
demons to fight. It was vital to raise questions, to consider how tainted the objectives of
the war had become after nearly seventeen years of conflict. Raising questions and doubt
was the centerpiece of le Carré’s novels, especially The Spy. When speaking about his
creation of his spy in the breakout novel, he stated:
I tried to…remake a figure who was involved in the dilemma of our time: that we cannot
continue with the war epic…Now we’ve got the big bomb…We have not got an
identifiable enemy; we have an ideology instead with which we must come to terms, and
it seemed to me that the institutions we create to combat the ideology to fight the Cold

70

le Carré, “A Conversation with John le Carré.” p. 4.
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
71

Huesing 47
War, are getting so big that the individual himself is losing his identity in our society, just
as he is in eastern society.73

The duration of any war takes a toll upon all citizens; but this war was unseen and
continually disrupted political, economic, and social progress across the globe. It was
only right to question the legitimacy of such a war, as the objectives in winning were far
too obscured by the 1960s. Demands for revising or adapting to the contemporary
conditions of the Cold War only persisted and gained further momentum amidst society.
The intelligence community was no exception to the scrutiny of criticism, especially after
events such as the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Intelligence Services, such as the CIA, MI6,
Mossad, or the KGB fought through the underground channels far from the public eye.
Yet, their clandestine missions were vastly tainted by the political inadequacies of the
era. Le Carré also stated, “I think the standard charter for an intelligence service is to
achieve by underhand means what a government is attempting to achieve by overt
means.”74 He also acknowledged that this posed a great dilemma. “The trouble is that so
few governments know exactly what they want to achieve. And so only rarely can
intelligence services determine and then pursue its own targets.”75 The clandestine
domain was tasked with carrying out the ‘dirty work’ of political objectives, but this
raised more problems than could actually be resolved. Referring back to the Bay of Pigs
Invasion, the United States government wanted to remove Fidel Castro from power after
he overthrew the U.S. allied government of Fulgencio Batista during the 1950s. When
political attempts to solve the issue failed, such as U.S. support of Cuban counterrevolutionaries and economic sanctions against Castro’s regime, the U.S. government
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funded a paramilitary brigade designed by the CIA to invade Cuba and crush Castro’s
regime. Once the invasion failed, the public gained firsthand knowledge over how
intelligence was highly influenced by politics and the United States government. It was
indeed dirty work, a last resort effort because the U.S. government could not prevent
Castro from assuming control of Cuba. The Bay of Pigs Invasion is a perfect example of
le Carré’s statement about intelligence trying to achieve through underhanded means
what the governments could not accomplish through sheer political action. Ultimately the
game of chase, quest, and interrogation was not a simple feat between two global
superpowers. Political and economic factors played a major role in intelligence. Although
espionage activity became synonymous with the Cold War, it was all too often slow
paced, lacking the glamour that most assumed it entailed. The price was paid by those
anti-Castro Cubans left to rot in Castro’s jails.
Moving back to le Carré’s The Spy, the novel was a poignant revelation about the
state of intelligence, politics, institutions, and East-West methods in fighting the Cold
War. The narrative served as the perfect platform for le Carré to divulge his opinions and
it echoed the issues the correlated with Cultural Détente. The main protagonist and spy,
Alec Leamas, discovers through his last mission that both the East and West adopt
equally inhumane methods of conducting secretive warfare. The Spy was the first
narrative of intrigue written by a Western author that openly criticized and drew attention
to Western tactics. This was a monumental departure from the pro-Imperial tales of
James Bond and provided a much bleaker, yet realistic outlook on Intelligence Services
and operations. The novel became an international bestseller and was made into a major
motion picture in 1965. Directed by Martin Ritt, a well-known lefty progressive, Leamas

Huesing 49

was portrayed by celebrated actor Richard Burton.76 The film received positive reviews
and pulled in $7,600,000 in the box office. For 1965, that was an impressive haul. It was
also nominated for Academy Awards, BAFTA awards, and Golden Globes, among many
other film honors. Several of those nominated in association with the film won awards,
including a BAFTA award for Best British Film in 1966, which propels popularity among
viewing audiences. There was no denying that the public revered the novel; according to
Tony Barley the novel was reprinted twelve times in six months and sold approximately
twenty million copies in ten years.77 Stephen J. Whitfield stated that the novel sold two
hundred and thirty thousand copies in the United States alone in 1964.78 He professed, “It
became the first thriller ever to outsell all other works of fiction.”79 Additionally, over the
next year, two million copies were sold in the U.S.80 Barley proclaimed that the triumph
of the novel was “due to a recognition that it did not simply reproduce the standard
generic and political orthodoxies.”81 The novel “consciously” and “persistently
challenges the ideological assumptions.”82 It was clear that le Carré was outwardly
stating exactly what the public had been thinking; that the war was in confused disarray;
that governments needed to adapt to the changes taking root within popular culture; most
importantly, that the definition of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ needed revising. These were all
hallmarks of Cultural Détente and le Carré proved to be a part of that movement with his
bold critiques in The Spy. Reviewer Robert M. Adams wrote, “The book is an intricate
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and moving study, among other things, of history and men as its active and passive
agents…le Carré has given more thought to the problem of ends and means than our
usual cheap formularies provide.”83 This review was a remarkable achievement for le
Carré because his work was now being recognized in high-brow intellectual circles.84
Clearly his critiques struck upon a nerve. The Spy may have propelled le Carré’s fame as
an artist, but it also provided him with a vital platform from which to raise important and
sensitive questions.
The Spy is unpropitious and dark; full of cynicism, doubt, and bitter betrayals. For
having been published in 1963, the novel assuredly came out amidst Cold War emotions
running high. The American U-2 incident in 1960; the Bay of Pigs and Berlin Wall in
1961; and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 were all in recent memory of an alert public.
Just two months after the release of the novel the world was shocked by the assassination
of U.S. President John F. Kennedy. Furthermore, by 1963 American involvement in the
Vietnam War had escalated, leading to a protracted war that would last until 1975. With
all of these events in mind, The Spy was not intended as a light-hearted novel that would
purely entertain; nor did it reveal any real hope. In actuality, the book functioned more as
a means to cast doubt over the East-West conflict, ending on a note of “unaccustomed
bitterness.”85
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Alec Leamas is ordered by ‘Control’---the head of Le Carré’s British Intelligence
Agency ‘the Circus’---to “stay out in the cold a little while longer.”86 Leamas believes
this last mission from Control is to bring down the powerful East German operative
Mundt, an evil Communist whom is murderous and callous.87 Leamas describes Control
as possessing “affected detachment…donnish conceits…same apoplectic adherence to a
code of behavior…same banality.”88 This is an important point for le Carré, as he was
trying to establish the ethos of Control as the functioning head of British Intelligence.
This one man literally held the ‘control’ over many lives, a fact le Carré does not want to
diminish. Control tells Leamas that his mission is to penetrate the East by posing as a
turncoat in order to bring down Mundt. Le Carré makes the conversation between Control
and Leamas interesting by revealing Control’s true sentiments in justifying his actions.
Control states, “Thus we do disagreeable things, but we are defensive. That, I think, is
still fair.”89 Le Carré brands Control as indifferent to the cruelties involved in fighting in
such a war; the West was not supposed to be indifferent. Claiming ‘defense’ only serves
as a justification for such actions, not a universal truth. Control further states, “We do
disagreeable things so that ordinary people here and elsewhere can sleep safely in their
beds at night…And in weighing up the moralities, we rather go in for the dishonest
comparisons; after all, you can’t compare the ideals of one side with the methods of the
other, can you now?”90 Control’s assessment of justifying actions reminds the reader that
ideals, morality, and ethics are easily blurred depending upon the lens through which one
views the war. He acknowledges that the West does ‘disagreeable things’ with the
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presumption that it provides peace to those it protects. He also states, “…our methods--ours and those of the opposition---have become much the same. I mean you can’t be less
ruthless than the opposition simply because your government’s policy is benevolent, can
you now?” This was a forced recognition of the dilemmas facing the contemporary Cold
War; an artistic choice that made le Carré’s literature stand apart from others. These
dilemmas raised more questions than they answered. What of those forced to live in the
Eastern bloc? Does their ideology condemn them simply because it was disagreeable to
Western values? Does it truly have any real justification in respect to the universal ideals
of humanity? These are some of the questions le Carré asks the readers, especially by
introducing such an outlook so early on in the novel.
Leamas’ mission is filled with angst, despair, and duplicities. He must make his
‘enemies’ believe he is no longer attached to the West, seeking refuge by defecting to the
East. This form of narrative gives the impression of a straight-forward spy fiction novel,
but le Carré complicates the plot once Leamas becomes entangled with Communist’s Liz
Gold and Fiedler. Both Communists are quite different in practice from one another, yet
possess similar qualities in their perceptions of philosophies. Leamas falls in love with
Liz, for she is innocent and naïve in her beliefs. Fiedler is an East German spy, but is
firmly grounded in the contradictions posed by competing ideologies. Fiedler is actually
an honest and good man, while Mundt is the true evil that the West should eliminate.
When Fiedler asks Leamas about his “philosophy,” he was seeking to understand what
motivates the West.91 “What makes them do it…if they do not know what they want, how
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can they be so certain they are right?”92 This was a poignant question, one that strikes the
reader due to its nature of infallibility. How was the West so sure that their cause was the
righteous one in the complex world? Who ultimately stands in judgement and can
provide an adequate answer? The layers of meaning that le Carré evoked were critical to
the mindset behind Cultural Détente attitudes. When Fiedler provides reasoning and
justification for Communist methods, he did so with conviction. He stated, “…a
movement which protects itself against counter-revolution can hardly stop at the
exploitation---or the elimination…of a few individuals. It is all one, we have never
pretended to be wholly just in the process of rationalistic society.”93 Thus, Fiedler refuses
to diminish Eastern methods and challenges Leamas by pointing out that Western hatred
is not justified through its actions. At least in the East it was “expedient that one man
should die for the benefit of many.”94 Communism did not claim to be righteous, it
claimed to be progress. In the East, their methods and actions justify and “weigh the
balance,” while in the West (based upon Christianity) “Christians may not draw the
balance.”95 So, what exactly was the motivation for the West to continue in fighting the
Cold War? That was the vital question le Carré presented, pointing out that although the
West made lofty claims about protecting democratic ideals, in practice they exploited
individuals (and ideals) in order to achieve means to an end.
Le Carré obscures the reality of Leamas’ true mission, even unto Leamas himself.
He is actually a pawn being used by Control in a much larger scheme to save the evil
Mundt and sacrifice the honest Fiedler and Liz. This mission costs innocent lives, such as
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Leamas’ lover Liz Gold. Leamas is even expendable to Control since he was sent without
any knowledge of what was truly happening to him. Again, le Carré openly and daringly
forced the readers to see that Western methods of conducting the war did not differ much
from that of the East. In fact, Control’s plot was far more devious and utilized human
beings in order to serve a higher political purpose. The West was supposed to defend
innocent lives, not condemn them through ulterior motives and actions. Le Carré
pronounces a profound truth in The Spy---that what you see was not always the truth.
Sometimes the truth was ugly and costly. The Cold War was full of hideous truths,
whether political, social, or ideologically motivated. He proved that there was a reason to
question the legitimacy of the war. He brought about the notion that definable ‘enemies’
were intangible, not as easily distinguished as ‘Communists’ or ‘Democrats.’ The Cold
War was fluid, ever-changing, and rapidly evolving from prior impracticalities; a notion
that remained with the author throughout his career.
Le Carré felt certain that The Spy remained a neutral interpretation of intelligence
and politics in the Cold War. He argued that his treatment of the East was equivalent to
that of the West, bringing balance to both sides of the conflict. He was so sure of his
novel that he sent copies of it to publication houses and to critics in the Eastern bloc. No
Western author had attempted this before, as there was strict censorship and a ban on
anti-Communist material throughout the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, The Spy was
reviewed in Moscow by the Soviet critic V. Voinov in the Literaturnaya Gazeta.96 Le
Carré was not only surprised, as he had not expected anyone in the Eastern bloc to
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actually read his work, but he “took considerable offence” over Voinov’s review.97
Voinov praised the novel’s “originality” but stated that it was a “hostile evaluation of the
author’s political assumptions.”98 Le Carré was trying to illuminate the disparity between
the means and ends in both the East and West; He was appealing to the Western
conscience and the democratic “evaluation of the individual’s place in society.”99 His
primary purpose of the novel was to “remove espionage from the sterile arguments of the
cold war and concentrate the reader’s eye on the cost to the West, in moral terms, of
fighting the legitimized weapons of Communism.”100 This was why he felt that Voinov’s
review was unfair in its judgement of the political and moral discrepancies about Western
hypocrisy. Voinov accused le Carré of elevating spies to the “rank of the true hero of our
age.”101 Additionally, he claimed Voinov accused him of assuming “the role of impartial
observer while my real function is to ‘fan the flames of the cold war.’”102 Le Carré
responded to Voinov’s criticisms in his ‘Open Letter,’ entitled “To Russia, with
Greetings.”103 He sent the letter via the Encounter, making note that his primary
objection with Voinov’s review was that he was accused as both a pro-Imperialist and
“an apologist of the cold war.”104 Between sending his novel to the East, Voinov’s
review, and le Carré’s ‘Open Letter’ in return, le Carré proved that he was much more
than a spy fiction author. He was passionate about the contemporary state of the Cold
War and the demands it placed upon citizens of the West. The public should be aware of
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the discrepancies between what Western governments say versus how they actually
conducted the means of warfare. Stephen J. Whitfield argued, “The culture of the Cold
War decomposed when the moral distinction between East and West lost a bit of its
sharpness, when American self-righteousness could be more readily punctured, when the
activities of the two superpowers assumed greater symmetry.”105 This was exactly le
Carré’s message and theme in The Spy Who Came in From the Cold, and once again, was
a principal factor in how he shaped the birth of the Cultural Détente.
The Spy and le Carré both received phenomenal reviews. TIME magazine has
named the novel as one of the “All-TIME 100 Novels” since its foundation in 1923, with
critic Lev Grossman calling it “a sad, sympathetic portrait of a man who has lived by lies
and subterfuge.”106 In 1964, New York Times critic Anthony Boucher called it “a
substantial and penetrating novel of our times.”107 Robert M. Adams added, “it’s a cold
world, not just for spies but for humanity.”108 Even in the years after the Cold War, The
Spy has continued to garner critical acclaim. Louis Menad stated, “le Carré transformed
the genre,” while The Spy’s “genius was to conceive of the Wall not as separating the
destinies of East and West but as yoking them together.”109 Clearly le Carré had found a
critique that not only fit his literary style, but also served as a platform for his personal
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opinions on the Cold War. The Spy continues to make numerous lists as one of the
essential novels of the 20th Century.110
Le Carré broke new ground with The Spy, tapping into an awareness that was
beginning to evolve. He would continue with his critiques in his fourth novel The
Looking-Glass War, published in 1965.111 TLGW further extrapolated the complex
themes involved in the Cold War epic. Even for the 1960s, the average middle-aged adult
held an enduring memory of World War II. The impact of the war was still felt in the
political, economic, and social reconstruction of a war-torn Europe. The catastrophic
event altered geographic borders, cultural assimilations of groups, and more profoundly
led to the dawn of the nuclear age. It would be naïve to believe that the impact of World
War II had lost its strength by the 1960s. Thus, le Carré drew upon those memories in the
invention his characters in TLGW. In reality, as in his fiction, numerous secret agents
working in intelligence had experienced the war through military service or as
intelligence officers. Plugging into that emotional consciousness was a strategic move on
behalf of le Carré. George Smiley and Alec Leamas, along with majority of his characters
in TLGW such as Leclerc, Adrian Haldane, and Fred Leiser had all come from a World
War II background in their formative years. This was a poignant detail, which provided
historical context for the characters and their collective experiences. TLGW would build
upon their nostalgia for a war that made sense in its moral and ethical principles.
Le Carré believed that his reading audience did not altogether understand his
overall message he was seeking to impart in The Spy. He mentioned this is his
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Introduction to TLGW, further illuminating exactly what his intentions were and would
be in his fourth novel. He wanted to make his points perfectly clear so that any confusion
would be eliminated. He stated, “So this time…I’ll tell it the hard way. This time, cost
what it will, I’ll describe a Secret Service that is really not very good at all; that is eking
out its wartime glory; that is feeding itself on Little England fantasies; is isolated,
directionless, overprotected and destined ultimately to destroy itself.”112 As le Carré
viewed it, and as he wrote about in TLGW, the intelligence community itself served as a
perfect example of the competition among bureaucratic rivalries; power that had become
too expansive; class-driven consequences; and the growing reliance upon the United
States for guidance in a complex war.113 Le Carré was also attentive to the British
sensitivity in becoming a second-rate power behind the United States. The loss of its
glorious Empire dwindled as its former colonies began to break free from the control of
England. Decolonization had a profound social impact upon the world, forging new
cultural identities and geo-political boundaries. This came as a great loss for Great
Britain, but it was absurd that the government continued to believe that possessing
colonies around the world was a legitimate feat in the 20th Century. Progress meant
change and le Carré was a firm believer in moving past the Imperial rule of Great Britain.
The loss of the British Empire was also another aspect of how influential the Cultural
Détente movement had become by the 1960s. Citizens in British colonies advocated for
their own autonomy, which meant that the movement was not isolated to just the United
States and Great Britain.
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Le Carré often described the American ‘Cousins’ as being arrogant, cynical, and
calculating in his novels. Once again, art often reflects the artists’ true frame of mind as it
is projected throughout his work. With Great Britain following the lead of the United
States in the Cold War era, the American’s dominated Western politics, economics, and
ideologies. There is no doubt that many, like le Carré, held bitterness in their attitudes
towards the United States. For him it was not so much the loss of global prominence, but
the amassed control and influence the American’s had upon the global world. The U.S.
government used their status to force concepts that complied with their standards or
democratic ideals. Examples of this would be American involvement in the Korean and
Vietnam Wars, places that did not need intervention at the behest of the United States. Ho
Chi Minh, the revolutionary leader of the Communist party in Vietnam, sought freedom
from French rule in French-Indochina. He even cited the American Declaration of
Independence as a means to convey the freedom of choice in establishing a new
Communist Vietnam nation. The American’s, as they had in Korea, intervened through
military force in order to stop the spread of Communism (as part of their ‘domino
theory’). Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese revolutionaries should have been justified
through their universal freedoms; the problem was that their definition of freedom did not
correlate to the United States’ vision of global democracy. These wars are an
unadulterated example of the how the American’s wielded their dominance and influence
without regards to the moral and ethical universal beliefs that every citizen of the world is
entitled to hold.
Despite le Carré’s depictions of the American’s in his novels he was still able to
capture a wide audience in the United States. As was proved by his successful sales in the
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country, his growing popularity made him the spy author to read. Perhaps the reason he
found success in the United States was because his messages resonated with his reading
audience. Not only did they want to hear what he had to say---along with sheer
entertainment---they also accepted the challenges he posed in viewing the present-day
issues of the Cold War. Le Carré made his intentions with TLGW clear in his Introduction
as a means to rectify any sort of confusion that readers and critics might have about the
sensitive material he was attempting to tackle. In his fourth novel he presented an
intelligence outfit, separate from his British ‘Circus,’ with members who were either lost
in the nostalgia of the glory days of war or were too naïve to grasp the depth of their own
deteriorating condition. During a 1965 interview about TLGW’s characters le Carré
stated, “The men of whom I speak are already condemned: they are finished, worn-out;
their emotional experiences were dulled during the war. They are the last of a lost
generation…The material I have chosen extrapolates the theme of espionage. I attempted
to illustrate the paradox of war. It sacrifices the individual in the battle against the
collectivity, which is absurd.”114 The title of his novel is symbolic of Lewis Carroll’s
1871 children’s novel, Through the Looking-Glass. Just as Alice climbed through the
mirror into a fantastical world, so too were le Carré’s characters Leclerc, Haldane, Avery,
and Leiser subjected to the realities behind the mirror. In his Introduction he also stated:
Such an outfit, if I got it right, would speak not only for the British Intelligence
community of the ‘sixties…it would presume to speak also for Little England itself, the
England of the Suez campaign…In a word, I would use the spy story to tell a roman noir
in which the British Intelligence Service would be portrayed as a political somnambulant,
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tapping about in the after-lunch haze of victory, uncertain anymore whether it is fighting
the Russians or the Germans, but fighting anyway, because not to fight is to wake up.115

Le Carré, as was his usual style, was not to waste a minute on critiquing Western
involvement in the Cold War. This statement in his interview really illuminates how
paradoxical the war had become and it was no longer measuring up to the earlier reasons
of fighting the war in the first place. As a citizen, first and foremost, le Carré along with
others, no longer found the political reasons legitimate in carrying on. This, again, was a
watermark in Cultural Détente.
TLGW was about a small intelligence outfit--- “the Department”--- which
believed Soviet missiles were being placed near the West German border; subsequently
based on outdated modes of intelligence evidence and a series of blunders, the
Department viewed this as a means to become active in the world of Cold War espionage.
Operating outside of the Circus, the Department was comprised of men whom longed for
the glory days of World War II intelligence; yet their capabilities were limited and
archaic. Leclerc, the head of the Department is by far the most nostalgic character in the
novel. He is old-fashioned, insufficiently equipped, and holds aspirations that are far
beyond his reach. Their headquarters are located in a rundown house, full of outdated
equipment that serves no functional purpose. It is with humility that Leclerc must go to
Control at the Circus in order to gain approval and a bit of help with the mission he is
trying to put into place. Despite all of their efforts over the course of the novel, Leclerc,
Haldane, and Avery come to the bitter realization that they have sent Fred Leiser, their
spy, into the East without any hope of saving him. They never inform Leiser that their
department is small, not united with the Circus, and that he is truly the only spy they have
115
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active in the field. Of course Control and Smiley both knew that this would be the
outcome from the very onset, they even abetted it but did nothing to prevent this tragic
demise. Control allocated non-functional equipment to Leclerc, thus giving him the
illusion that he was operating a well-coordinated mission. As le Carré had mentioned,
this novel was very much about competing rivalries and class distinctions, along with
inflated power. Once again, le Carré demonstrates how the individual can be easily
sacrificed for the collective and his paradox of war become vivid through the plights of
his characters. The Cold War was becoming more chaotic and convoluted as time passed
by. Even discerning the real ‘enemies’ was no longer an effective tool in combating the
Cold War. In intelligence spies are easily deceived, even by their own fellow
countrymen. Le Carré demonstrated this through Control’s actions, making him and
Smiley a bit of the ‘enemy’ in this tragic tale. Just a year prior to the publication of
TLGW, this happened when the well-respected British spy Kim Philby defected to the
Soviet Union. Philby’s betrayal shook the intelligence community to its core and proved
that le Carré’s narratives could bear some truths.
Kim Philby was part of the ‘Cambridge Five’ and was the suspected ‘third man’
after Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean’s defection in 1951. The fourth identified
member of this conspiracy group was Anthony Blunt, who confessed his association as a
double agent in 1964. Unlike the other three, Blunt was granted immunity for confessing
and his secret life as a spy was not released until 1979. The treachery of these British
double agents, especially Kim Philby who had once been the senior SIS liaison officer in
Washington, had a profound impact on British Intelligence. Since Philby was in such a
high-ranking position in MI6 (along with other high profile positions), he caused massive
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damage for the West by leaking so much important information to his Soviet controllers.
There is no way of knowing exactly how much harm came by way of Philby’s actions,
but it was a shocking betrayal considering how long he served in MI6. In order for Philby
to get away with his double life for so long, at some point the British Intelligence Agency
had to be negligent in their regards to Philby. He was the source of suspicion back when
Burgess and Maclean defected and MI5 director Dick White even had severe opinions
over Philby.116 Even the American’s, principally the CIA’s James Jesus Angleton, was
taken by Philby’s charms.117 Le Carré provided an introduction to a book on Kim Philby,
in which he stated:
…I am uncomfortably conscious of the “we”: Philby’s is one of those cases which force
us to define our own place in society. If the secret services were negligent in controlling
Philby, so Parliament and we ourselves, society at large, were equally negligent in
controlling our own secret services. It was our politicians’ who fronted for them, our
editors who suppressed for them, our dons who informed for them, recruited for them;
our Prime Minister who protected them.118

In just a few brief sentences, le Carré called into question every aspect of responsibility
by governments, institutions, and society. He made it plain that it was the failures of
those institutions which allowed for Philby to act in the way he did. Le Carré made a bold
political and social statement, standing up for the growing dissent within a culture that
had been suppressed by cover-ups and lies. Philby, like each events that carried on,
proved that le Carré was correct in his assessment of the Cold War. In its contemporary
state, citizens would not continue to support this war epic. There has also been ample
proof linking le Carré to the Cultural Détente movement. As the thaw began to subside,
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the activists and reformists came out in droves for the New Left and Countercultures
movements that began in the mid-1960s. It is vital to note that Cultural Détente was a
stepping-stone for the public in order to firmly enact political and social reforms. Other
artists were soon to follow in the footsteps of John le Carré. However, no one had
embraced these critiques as quite early or as forcefully as he did. He made his spy fiction
narratives much more than pieces of fictional entertainment; he made them vessels of a
larger mission to engage the public in a brand new dialogue about the costs of Western
involvement in a obscured battle of ideologies. For this, the author is inextricably
entwined with Cultural Détente and the progress the movement had upon mainstream
popular culture.
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Chapter 3
By the early 1960s the cultural and political landscape of America was beginning
to evolve away from Cold War assumptions that shaped the popular culture of the 1950s.
The presidential election of 1960 brought the young Democrat, John F. Kennedy into the
Oval Office. Kennedy beat out incumbent Republican Vice-President Richard Nixon;
which signaled that the American public was ready for change and perhaps a new
direction in foreign policy. During President Kennedy’s short time in office, he faced
numerous foreign and domestic issues, many of which derived from the Cold War. While
the previous chapter detailed the early-1960s Cold War crises that Kennedy had to face,
some of his other policies served to challenge the status quo in the foreign and domestic
spheres.119 Politics undeniably shapes popular culture, as policies and legislation can
either advocate or negate social causes and advancements. This was quite important in
analyzing the decade that would become defined by its radical transformations.
Additionally, the policies of Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, also proved
essential in understanding how 1960s popular culture was expressed in political and
social beliefs.120 Kennedy was a cold warrior, but Stalin was long dead and the Soviet
Union had already proclaimed “peaceful coexistence”. The Soviets no longer posed a
119
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threat as they once had. American popular culture could no longer continue in its
simplistic depiction of Communists and Communism. Leaders of Cultural Détente like
authors and artists, most notably John le Carré, anticipated a shift in relations. By the
early-1960s it became clear that society was ready to embrace a relaxation of tensions.
Although politics was a tremendous influence on the American culture of the Cold War,
this research will show that American culture shaped and influenced politics.
The 1960s were a decade of change and social progress. Reform groups and
activists began to demand civil liberties for African-Americans, women, and gay rights.
The ideal of the 1950s ‘nuclear family’ was challenged by blended families and divorce.
College campuses became the grassroots for student movements across the country. The
public demand for the relaxation of tensions became evident in the art produced; the
reformist attitudes; the gathering of intellectual circles committed to enacting progress;
and the widespread protests of the era.
It must be noted that there were a few select examples of satires, parodies, and
black comedy during the late-1950s and early-1960s. The most significant was MAD
magazine’s publication of Spy vs. Spy in 1961. It is also poignant that this was the same
year as le Carré’s publication of Call For the Dead, so Spy vs. Spy hardly diminished the
importance of le Carré’s work. The concept of this cartoon was that of two agents
involved in constant espionage tactics. One spy was white, while the other was solid
black. This held no meaning over who was ‘good’ or ‘evil,’ as they equally engage one
another. They look identical except for their color differences and they constantly
antagonize one another, waring among them until a victor emerges. In each publication a
different spy would win, set metaphorically against the Cold War backdrop with the fight
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between the United States and Soviet Union. Their silly antics and use of booby traps are
the means to which a spy emerges victorious. The point was that neither side in the Cold
War was actually winning; they were constantly antagonizing one another as the years
progressed. It was a pointless, wasteful, cynical “game” that outsiders should reject. In
context to Cultural Détente, Spy vs. Spy had very little immediate impact on the
movement. It did demonstrate out of the box thinking, but its target audiences were
juvenile: children, teenagers, and young adults. Most of these missed the serious message
about the Cold War. Le Carré’s audience derived from middle-brow readers. His novels
were far more versatile than the simplicities of Spy vs. Spy. However, these children of
1961 would soon become the rebellious and questioning youth of the “Sixties” due in no
small part due to the influence of Mad Magazine and Spy vs. Spy.
For Cultural Détente, art mediums served as platforms from which to critique the
Cold War; breaking from the suppression of art in the 1950s. Several artists during the
early-1960s were creating films, literature, and television programs that in some capacity
condemned the Cold War. They highlighted the fact that more was to be feared from
their own government than the external “enemy.” As mentioned in the previous chapter,
le Carré was the first to provide a wide ranging condemnation of Western methods in
fighting the war and his critiques were well heeded by society.121 Other artists at the time
produced discernable critiques, if not all out warnings; but they usually consisted of
limited arguments. This is no way diminishes their contributions to Cultural Détente; in
fact it further supported the radical ideologies sweeping through society.
121
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The Manchurian Candidate was a novel written by Richard Condon in 1959. By
1962, director John Frankenheimer adapted the novel into a major motion picture. The
Manchurian Candidate is a satirical, political thriller filled with irony and dark thematic
devices that extrapolates 1960s Cold War issues. The film (and novel) was as much about
the enemy within as it the enemy without. The primary focus is about a Communist
infiltration through the brainwashing of a Korean War Staff Sergeant Raymond Shaw.
The idea of a Communist infiltration corroborated early Cold War sentiments; however
the story takes multiple twists in order to provide a psychologically complex thriller.
Shaw had been brainwashed by the Chinese and the Soviets, but all memories of this are
erased. He returns home to his mother, Mrs. Iselin, and stepfather, Senator Iselin, a
staunch right-wing political family. References to McCarthyism are not lost upon the
audience, as it is made clear through the actions and comments of Senator Iselin.
Historian Margot A. Henriksen stated, “At the urging and direction of his ambitious wife,
Senator Iselin made his name and his political career on the issue of anticommunism,
using the method of witch-hunting.”122 Additionally she added, “…the brutal and inane
anticommunism of Senator Iselin is presented as more corrosive than any form of
communism.”123Despite his ambitions, Senator Iselin was an opportunist, careerist, and is
ultimately despised by his stepson Raymond Shaw. As the plot unfolds, Raymond Shaw
is being controlled and triggered by the Queen of Diamonds. It is revealed that Mrs.
Iselin is the Communist agent whom controls her son’s triggers; all the while pretending
to be an avowed American patriot. Henriksen also stated, “…the irony that Iselin is in
fact in the hands of a communist contributes to the film’s black humor, as does Iselin’s
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anticommunist buffoonery.”124 In this capacity, the plot becomes convoluted. The idea
was to present an all-American family that was fighting the enemy within; yet each
member equally contributed to the bigger threat (whether intentional or not). Mrs. Iselin
has plans to trigger her son in order to secure the presidency under Communist influence.
However, Shaw’s friend, Major Ben Marco, helps to uncover Shaw’s brainwashing. He
attempts to recondition Shaw, removing the power of the Queen of Diamonds. The end of
the film (and novel) is bleak at best. During a political convention Mrs. Iselin tries to
trigger her son to assassinate Iselin’s rival. Instead, in a Freudian twist, Shaw murders his
mother and stepfather and then commits suicide. He is ultimately deemed as a hero for
his efforts. For all of its suspense, black comedy, and political thematic devices, The
Manchurian Candidate served as a good example of Cold War entertainment that came
with a broad and powerful message. What the film did achieve was it “collapsed all
distinctions between anticommunism and communism: both systems emerged as
examples of political repression.”125 The overall impact of the film/novel was to further
bolster support for the reactive opposition to early Cold War thinking. It found positive
responses from both book and movie critics. It brought in a domestic box office haul of
$7.7 million dollars, with Angela Lansbury (Mrs. Iselin) winning the Academy Award
and Golden Globe for Best Supporting Actress. Awards bring more buzz for films,
pulling in larger audiences and money; proof that the message is accepted and supported
by the movie going public. Movie critic Roger Ebert gave the film four stars, calling it a
“great film.”126 He stated that it was “inventive and frisky,” taking “enormous chances
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with the audience and plays not like a ‘classic’ but as a work alive and smart.” In 1994,
the film was added to the United States National Film Registry by the Library of
Congress for preservation for being “culturally, historically, and aesthetically
significant.”127In relation to Cultural Detente, The Manchurian Candidate’s
psychological impact helped to reinforce ideas of mistrust. Issues with political
authorities and ‘enemies’ pervades the story, further extrapolating themes that correlated
with the thaw.128
If there was a breakout year for Cold War films, it was in 1964. Three powerful
films were released, including Dr. Strangelove or: How I Stopped Worrying and Learned
to Love the Bomb; Fail-Safe; and Seven Days in May. Each of these three films held
strong messages about the thermonuclear age. Through satire, parody, black comedy, and
psychological thrillers, these films contributed to the growing disdain and mistrust in
Western governments and their nuclear policies. With such similar themes, albeit through
different approaches, the authors and directors of these films/novels had a clear critique
about the contemporary Cold War. As with le Carré’s spy fiction novels and films, these
films serve as historical time capsules, preserving the fears, anxiety, and momentum that
propelled reforms in Cold War popular culture.
The most controversial film in 1964 was Dr. Strangelove. Directed by Stanley
Kubrick, the film used black comedy, parody, and satire to unveil a formidable nuclear
threat. Henriksen stated about the film, that it “in itself helped to reinvigorate a dynamic
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tension in America between the forces of cultural dissent and the forces of political and
technological status quo.”129 Not everyone found humor or entertainment in Kubrick’s
film. Reviewer George W. Linden felt “deep ambivalence” and further described the
horrified reactions of fellow audience viewers at the time.130 The main plot of the film
revolves around three locations: the ‘War Room,’ an Air Force Base, and a B-52 bomber.
The crazed General Jack D. Ripper (at the Air Base) has commanded the B-52 bombers
to launch a nuclear strike against Soviet Russia. Ripper is the only person in possession
of the three digit code that could recall the bombers and end the strike; yet he refuses to
give it up and then commits “suicide.” Here is where Kubrick parodies humorous
elements; the name of his crazy General was symbolic of the 19th Century serial killer
‘Jack the Ripper.’ Even Dr. Strangelove’s name was symbolic of the ‘strange’ acceptance
of living in a nuclear age. After the bombers are sent on their mission the story moves to
the ‘War Room’ where the U.S. President, Joint Chiefs of Staff, RAF advisers, Soviet
Ambassador, and Dr. Strangelove all convene over how to stop the B-52’s. Kubrick
pokes fun at the Washington-Moscow ‘Hotline,’ as the President and Soviet Premier
attempt to negotiate. The Premier tells the President that if the Soviets are attacked, a
series of Doomsday Devices will detonate radioactive material around the world, causing
a nuclear holocaust. Through blunders, mishaps, and a fight, the code is finally recovered
and the bombers are stopped--- all but one. This B-52 bomber is led by Major T. J. ‘King’
Kong and in a final act he straddles a nuclear bomb as it is released upon its target. The
Doomsday Devices are triggered and Dr. Strangelove suggests repopulating the earth
through underground mine shafts. In the finale a series of nuclear explosions are
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displayed across the screen accompanied by the popular WW II song “We’ll Meet
Again.” The main point in the film was to provide a true condemnation of the U.S.
nuclear policies. That an ‘accident’ could bring about World War III on a much more
devastating level was not lost upon viewers. Additionally, that someone other than the
U.S. president could bring about nuclear destruction was something to worry about;
nothing is ever fool-proof. These were viable questions in 1964 and the public had a right
to feel strong resentments towards the U.S. nuclear system. Henriksen stated, “the
ultimate irrationality of living with the bomb dictated temper of the film, thereby
challenging the cherished seriousness and rationality of America’s nuclear ethos and
establishment.”131 Both Stanley Kubrick and his film remain resolute in sending a
warning to the audience. They needed to question the ethics of the nuclear arms race; and
they should question the governing powers over their responsibility to society as
representatives of the people. Dr. Strangelove made this message completely clear. Dr.
Strangelove moved in the same direction as John le Carré. No longer was the army
coming to save the day; the Air Force, or at least the rogue Gen. Ripper, destroyed the
day and every day thereafter. Dr. Strangelove’s eccentricities were possible because of
Cultural Détente. By questioning the nuclear establishment and the infallibility of man,
Kubrick was illuminating the growing discord between citizen and state. Even though his
film used dark humor his message was entirely clear. We had created a device that was
capable of mass destruction. It was only natural that there would be a psychological
impact and insecurities. Like le Carré, Kubrick highlighted mistrust, rogue power, and
minimal accountability.
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Fail-Safe was also released in 1964, directed by Sidney Lumet and based on the
1962 novel of the same name, written by Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler. Much
like Dr. Strangelove, Fail-Safe was based on a nuclear crisis that went severely wrong.
The plot revolves around an accidental thermonuclear first-strike by U.S. bombers in a
mishap mission to Moscow. Betrayed by technology gone wrong, in short, the film
evoked the fearful realities of living in an advanced nuclear age; where one mistake could
decimate millions of lives. With U.S. bombers proceeding to aerial ‘fail-safe’ points due
to an unidentified flying object, a technical error occurs signaling the bombers to
commence their attack on Moscow. Once again, through blunders and mishaps by both
the U.S. and Soviets (who have scrambled and jammed the bombers radio signals), the
impending first nuclear strike becomes a reality. The U.S. President and Soviet Chairman
begin negotiations, but the Soviets ensure a counterattack if Moscow is bombed. In the
dismal end, the U.S. President gives up New York City after Moscow is bombed,
commanding the nuclear destruction of one of America’s largest cities. This was the
sacrifice and cost of the ‘accidental’ strike. Fail-Safe is a dark thriller that played upon
the psychological elements of thermonuclear scientific progress and the fallibility of man
to such tremendous power. Again, this film raised moral and ethical questions about the
government’s power to enact such laws. It is certainly arguable that American society had
the natural rights to demand reform, especially nuclear reforms. The growth of antinuclear positions became a strong driving force in popular culture and the American
thaw. Henriksen stated that Fail-Safe, “…was an effective critical account of America’s
nuclear bureaucracy and its profession of technological control and infallibility.”132
Referring back to le Carré’s critiques about the over-expansion of Western bureaucracies
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and their power, Henriksen’s quote certainly lines up with the political and social
conflicts of the period. In the preface to the Fail-Safe novel, authors Burdick and Wheeler
stated their intentions in writing such a bleak novel. They stated, “For there is substantial
agreement among experts that an accidental war is possible and that its probability
increases with the increasing complexity of the man-machine components which make up
our defense system.”133 Taking these comments in context to the time of the novel’s
publication, it clearly displayed a critical argument for the serious and threatening U.S.
nuclear status quo.
Seven Days in May was directed by John Frankenheimer (the same director of The
Manchurian Candidate) and was released in early 1964. The film was based upon the
novel of the same name, written by Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey II. Once
again, like the other two films, Seven Days in May held strong criticisms of the nuclear
arms race and American popular culture. This was by all accounts a political thriller that
provided the extra psychological twists to make the message more ominous and grave.
Director John Frankenheimer revealed that President Kennedy loved The Manchurian
Candidate so much that he helped with the production of Seven Days of May by moving
out of the White House for nearly a week so that the director could actually film scenes
there.134 The main plot revolves around a military-political coup d’état of the United
States government led by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a sector of the military called
ECOMCON---Emergency COMmunications CONtrol. This takeover came as a result of
the severe disapproval of a nuclear disarmament treaty signed with the Soviet Union
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(taking place in the 1970s). Those that are a part of the coup d’état are seeking to seize
control of the entire country’s telephone, radio, and televisions over a seven day period.
Henriksen stated about Kennedy’s cooperation with the film, that it “indicated that at
least one major figure in America’s establishment did not object to the critical portrait of
atomic age America presented in the film.”135 Citizens in the film are torn into two
opposing groups: one side agrees whole-heartedly with the treaty, while the other side
believes that the Soviets cannot be trusted. President Lyman Jordan fully asserts that
without the disarmament treaty, one day a nuclear war will come, turning the Cold War
into a hot war. President Jordan’s greatest opposition is General James Scott, the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and leader of the coup. His secret society of
politicians and military personnel rallies to overthrow Jordan and his entire cabinet.
Unfortunately for General Scott, his aide Colonel Casey becomes quite suspicious and
reveals Scott’s plans to President Jordan. The very existence of the free world is at stake
with Scott’s planned coup and eventually enough evidence is gathered to expose Scott to
the American public. President Jordan wins out in the end and actually holds no blame
against Scott.
He asserts:
He's not the enemy. Scott, the Joint Chiefs, even the very emotional, very illogical lunatic fringe: they're
not the enemy. The enemy's an age - a nuclear age. It happens to have killed man's faith in his ability to
influence what happens to him. And out of this comes a sickness, and out of sickness a frustration, a feeling
of impotence, helplessness, weakness. 136

Just like the films already presented in this chapter, Seven Days in May was
wrapped around the madness of the nuclear system; enemies within and without; power
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in the hands of opportunists; and an indictment of the impact all these themes had upon
American values and popular culture. Henriksen further stated, “Dr. Strangelove, FailSafe and Seven Days in May all presented dark images of atomic America in the midsixties and all three films contributed to the cultural understanding of the bomb’s central
role in shaping and damaging American society and culture.”137 The Cold War by the
mid-1960s looked nothing like it had just ten years prior. American’s were faced with
coming to terms over what it was like to live in a country that held such tremendous
power with its thermonuclear system. American’s held a lack of confidence in the
government and its institutions due to “corruption, insanity, arrogance, and
inhumanity.”138 Science and technology had produced the ultimate death machine and it
was in the hands of power that could be corrosive, and most importantly, imperfect and
fallible. All three of these films in 1964 in some capacity extrapolated those very themes
and showed the threat posed by them to American values and freedom.
In 1965, John le Carré’s spy fiction novel, The Spy Who Came In From The Cold,
based on his 1963 novel was released as a major motion picture. The film was directed by
Martin Ritt who had been blacklisted for his left-leaning political views. The Spy film
was made in black and white to capture the essence of the dark, bleak, isolated, and
alienated life of a spy; along with the harsh reality of East and West Germany. The film
made very few departures from le Carré’s narrative; despite that it attempted to capture
all of his messages in only 112 minutes. Oskar Werner, who portrayed Fiedler in the film,
won the 1966 Golden Globe Award for Best Supporting Actor. Also mentioned in
Chapter 2, the film received many other notable award nominations and wins in 1966.
137
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The Spy, like the book, was a departure from the films that were analyzed just a year prior
in 1964, which all held strong nuclear warnings. What distinguished The Spy was that it
revolved around the clandestine world, a very popular subject in Cold War popular
culture. Additionally, The Spy was so different from the James Bond movies that had
been made into films during the 1960s. With The Spy film, le Carré’s broad warnings and
critiques were displayed on the big screen for the first time, completely in opposition to
the pro-Imperialist Bond films. Overall, The Spy has withstood the test of time as a
unique historical lens into 1960s espionage and popular culture.139
The Spy expressed le Carré’s critiques by showing that Western governments,
institutions, and bureaucracies had adopted similar methods as their ‘enemies.’ Control
used Leamas as a pawn and disregarded innocent lives such as Fiedler and Liz Gold. By
actually saving the evil Mundt, Control proves that he was willing to do disagreeable
things in order to achieve means to an end. The honesty of Fiedler, and the naivety of Liz,
are perfect juxtapositions to the costs paid by the West in fighting this war epic. For those
that did not read the novel and only saw the film, Leamas and Liz’s death at the Berlin
Wall was indeed a shocking betrayal. It extrapolated le Carré’s critiques, making them
impossible to ignore. The failures of the West in upholding the principles of democracy
are riddled throughout the film, making his critiques clear to audiences. Additionally, The
Spy was at the opposite end of the spectrum from the pro-Imperialist James Bond films.
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Instead of highlighting the supposed ‘glamour’ of the intelligence community, The Spy
highlighted the negativity and discord that came from the real-world of the Cold War.
One cannot review Cold War films of the 1960s without including the six James
Bond films produced throughout the decade. In sharp contrast to le Carré’s narratives of
intrigue based on realistic portrayals of British agents operating against the backdrop of
the Cold War, Ian Fleming’s works became increasingly ridiculous and over the top in
terms of Cold War spying. The majority of the Bond films made during the 1960s, which
were adapted from his novels, had very little to do with the actual Cold War. His early
novels during the 1950s (seven in total) did pit MI6 agent James Bond ‘007’ against the
massive Soviet counterintelligence organization SMERSH (which meant Special
Methods of Spy Detection). Due to publication rights and legal battles between
production companies and directors, the sequence in which the books were developed
into major motion pictures were out of order from Fleming’s publications, beginning in
1953 with Casino Royale. The first Bond novel to actually become adapted into a film
was Fleming’s sixth book, Dr. No (1958). Dr. No was released on film in 1962, followed
by From Russia With Love (1963); Goldfinger (1964); Thunderball (1965); You Only
Live Twice (1967); and On Her Majesty’s Secret Service (1969). Once again, these films
were released completely out of order from Fleming’s novel series. This caused the focus
of majority of these 1960s films to revolve around the criminal, terrorist global
organization SPECTRE (Fleming’s fictional master adversary). SPECTRE replaced
SMERSH as the main enemy for James Bond. Although SPECTRE appeared apolitical, it
actually had strong ties to Nazi Fascists instead of the Communist Soviets. Clearly for
Fleming, the Soviet Union and Communism were no longer the height of evil. Instead he
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revived World War II era ideas and attitudes, trying to make them applicable to the
contemporary Cold War. By reinstating these methods, Fleming was harkening back to
Great Britain’s glory days in the war; a time where enemies were easily discernable.
In all of these films, James Bond is ordered by MI6 to investigate absurd and
farcical supervillains and terrorist masterminds, most notably the head of SPECTRE,
Ernst Blofeld. Bond is constantly captured on island ‘liars,’ and is seduced by women
with names that are equally strange and outrageous. He aligns with the ‘mafia’ and
‘ninjas’; he searches for ludicrous weapons like an atomic-powered radio beam, a Lektor
cryptographic device, self-destruction systems, and bacteriological warfare agents, which
all somehow come into the hands of these supervillains whom have zero ties to any
nation. He fights the private armies of his villains, one of which breaks into Fort Knox
(which is absurd). He is never able to actually kill Blofeld, who recently made another
appearance in the 2015 Bond film Spectre. Another imperative point about Fleming’s
characters was that they were not only ridiculous at times, but some actually crossed
racial ethical boundaries. Fleming used stereotypes with his supervillains and some of
Bond’s allies. His choice of names, like the women in the films/novels, can be construed
as offensive and his stereotyping outweighed any form of quality in the development of
his characters traits. These 1960s films were just a few of the twenty-six James Bond
films made over the last fifty years. The series was continued by other artists after the
death of Ian Fleming in 1964. The James Bond franchise was a popular form of
entertainment and continues to thrive even today. However, as a critique over the Cold
War at the time, the James Bond series held very little serious considerations. Clearly
they were opposed to le Carré’s complex and inimitable contributions to Cold War
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spying and espionage, and more importantly to the Cultural Détente movement from
1960-1965.
The final film to be included in this analysis of 1960s American Cold War films is
the comedy The Russians Are Coming, The Russians Are Coming!140 Directed by
Norman Jewison, the film was based on The Off-Islanders by Nathaniel Benchley and
released in theatres in 1966. The theatrical film poster even made clear that this film was
absolutely different from any previous Cold War film released. It stated, “It’s a Plot!...to
make the world die laughing!!” by cartoonist Jack Davis, a Mad Magazine artist.141 The
Russians was a humorous spoof about a misinterpreted Russian invasion on a small town
off the coast of New England. When a Russian submarine accidentally becomes stranded
on a sandbar near the coast, nine Russians head to the local town and wreaks complete
havoc. The locals believed they were being attacked by the Russians, not realizing it was
a just a great mishap. Humorous misfortunes continued to plague both the Russians and
townspeople, as they decide to take up arms against their ‘invaders.’ Multiple blunders
created a laughable scenario between American and Russian relations. In the end, two
young boys threaten to jump from the church tower and the nine Russians and local
townspeople unite in saving them. The Russians are finally able to free their submarine
and the locals wish them goodbye and good well luck. The Russians proved that
American’s could find humor in the dark reality of the Cold War just a decade after the
McCarthy crusades and vigilant anti-Communism sweeping Hollywood. It was a
stunning reversal from the serious films about the Cold War. The Russians parodied,
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mocked, and poked fun of the entire conflict, providing comedic relief towards built-up
tensions. It also signified that culture was vastly changing by the mid-1960s; embracing
new concepts that were not entirely bleak and gloomy. The “Russians,” not communists,
were not to be feared but helped. The silliness of some Americans was juxtaposed with
the humanity and maturity of the Russian sub captain (Alan Arkin). This highlighted the
over exaggeration of anti-communist paranoia, making it laughable that such paranoias
had been rampant in the first place.
The films that have been highlighted here all correlate to the American (Western)
thaw. These artists, like John le Carré, were providing new interpretations over the EastWest conflict. Through brainwashing, espionage, nuclear crises, and mistrust each of
these films made bold comments about the 1960s political and social landscapes. It is
evident in these films that a deep mistrust had formulated between the public and private
sphere. Through Cultural Détente, these artists were able to provide opposing
commentaries, challenging the conformities of the past.
During the 1950s, television became the modern technology that brought news
and entertainment into American living rooms every night. The possibilities with
television programs were endless, becoming one of the most influential artistic mediums
that swayed mass public opinion.142 As we know, television has become a tremendous
part of mainstream popular culture and revolutionized American’s access to the latest
news and alternative forms of entertainment. The impact of television on Cold War
culture cannot be understated. During the 1950s, television programs aligned with the
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traditional American ‘nuclear family’ idealisms. By the 1960s, television shows were
breaking new boundaries and speaking for a generation that had cast off the traditional
restraints of the prior decade. Margot A. Henriksen stated, “…television in the early and
mid-sixties likewise illustrated America’s break from any certain rules of life and
behavior.”143 This new medium, along with many films in the 1960s, finally began to
explore other ‘ways’ to be an American, as opposed to the conformity that had shaped
early Cold War culture.144 While there was a myriad of programs that shaped Cold War
popular culture, this analysis will examine a few series that extrapolated the themes of
espionage in context to the Cold War. The popularity of spy related programs correlated
to the popularity of espionage films on the big screen. This demonstrated just how
widespread and in demand the clandestine business had become in mainstream culture,
immediately on the heels of Cultural Détente.
During the 1950s, spy-themed programs and films served as artifacts of the
McCarthy era and the Red Scare. Instead of analyzing the broader issues involved with
spying, or even the Cold War, they conformed to the patriotic call of American idealism.
In 1951, director Gordon Douglas released I Was A Communist For the FBI, which was
based on the Saturday Evening Post articles of Matt Cvetic. Cvetic’s experience as an
undercover Communist working for the FBI was also made into a book and radio series.
For nine years he had infiltrated the American Communist Party and reported their
activities to the bureau. The Communists in the film (and book/radio) were portrayed as
cynical, racist, and opportunists for the Soviet Union. They were never considered
‘American’ because of their allegiance to the Communist Party. This was an unfair
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stereotype, as it only conformed to the political agenda of the time. The New York Times
critic, Bosley Crowther condemned the meaning of the film. He stated, “In glibly
detailing how the Communists foment racial hate and labor unrest in this country…and
that most people who embrace liberal causes, such as the Scottsboro trial defense, are
Communist dupes…it plays a bit recklessly with fire.”145 The film further represents the
politicization of culture with such blatant propaganda.
I Led Three Lives was an American drama series that ran from 1953-1956. The
series was a companion to I Was A Communist For the FBI, dealing with almost the exact
same subject matter. The series was based on the three lives of Herbert Philbrick: a
Boston advertising executive; a secret Communist Party member; and the deeper secret as
an informant for the FBI. The series was made with the approval of the FBI, gathering
further support for the anti-Communist agenda initiated by McCarthyism, HUAC, the
FBI, and the Red Scare. The episodes of the series were not based on true events and
unfortunately grew completely outlandish. One episode was based on a Communist plot
to convert vacuum cleaners into bomb launchers. At this point the series had just become
laughable and completely implausible. Any chance to provide serious commentary was
overshadowed. The intent was to paint an evil portrait of the motives behind the
American Communist Party; in that they were subservient to the Soviet Union. Clearly by
the time of Cultural Détente, these outrageous strategies in reaching a mass audience
were no longer effective. By the end of the 1950s, both artists and citizens were looking
for new interpretations on the East-West conflict.
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By the mid-1960s, most major television networks were producing a program
about espionage, if not multiple. This included the Big Three, ABC; NBC; and CBS
which between them released I Spy, Get Smart, The Man From U.N.C.L.E., and The
Avengers. The British also put out their own versions of spy series, most notably, The
Prisoner a seventeen-episode series that ran from 1967-1968. Between films and
television programming, the esoteric and private world of secret agents took over the
landscape of popular entertainment.
The first groundbreaking spy television series was I Spy, which ran from 19651968 on the NBC network. Created by David Friedkin and Morton Fine, the series was
pioneering in that it utilized international locations in order to film realistic and authentic
backdrops. It was also one of the first television programs to place an African-American
(Bill Cosby) in a leading actor role. This was a daring, yet contemporary maneuver
considering the political and social struggle for civil rights during the 1960s. It revealed
social progress into a future where the average ‘white’ male or female did not need to
always play the lead roles. The series coalesced with the break from the conformities of
the 1950s, moving with the cultural advancements that transformed a new Cold War
generation. Networks and creators knew the American public was decidedly influenced
by the role espionage played in the Cold War and used the subject for entertainment and
profit values. I Spy was not only unique for its locations and choices of actors; it
approached the covert underground world through mostly serious themed episodes;
sometimes using humor to lighten situations. The series combined actors Richard Culp
and Bill Cosby to portray the secret agent tennis team: international tennis pro Kelly
Robinson and his trainer Alexander ‘Scotty’ Scott. The episodes revolved around the duo
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conducting covert operations against their enemies, sometimes touching upon the very
realistic side of Cold War espionage. In that capacity, it was unlike most of the other spythemed television programs at the time.146
Another hilarious spy-themed program, Get Smart, aired in 1965 backed by the
creative minds of famous funnyman Mel Brooks and partner Buck Henry. Get Smart was
a satire, parody, and spoof of the clandestine world and covert operations by secret
agents. The series premiered on the NBC network (1965-1969), before it moved to CBS
(1969-1970). Get Smart used every cliché possible to bring humor and dynamism to the
secret realm of espionage, especially by making jests towards the James Bond series. The
premise revolved around the ever-awkward secret agent Maxwell Smart, or Agent 86,
and his partner Agent 99. Both agents worked for a United States intelligence agency
called ‘CONTROL,’ with its functionary head simply called ‘chief.’ The two agents are
constantly chasing down enemies, despite the fact that Agent Smart tries too hard to play
by the rules and remains pretty inept as an effective spy. His nature and the situations it
constantly puts the duo into provide very humorous scenarios, making it quite the fun
comedy.147 Creator Mel Brooks has been known for his quirky personality and he brought
those quirks to the secret world of espionage. The general threat came from the evil
organization KAOS, with plans to take over the world; Smart and Agent 99 are always
engaged in battles with KAOS and ultimately always win. Even the names of the two
organizations ‘KAOS’ and ‘CONTROL’ was an amusing poke at the contemporary state

146

I Spy ran for three seasons with a 1994 reunion episode with Richard Culp and Bill Cosby. Additionally,
the series inspired the 2008 film I Spy, starring comedians Eddie Murphy and Owen Wilson.

Huesing 86

of the world in the 1960s. It is pretty clear the creators took liberty with their jests, which
also made the series stand apart from other spy-related television programs at the time.
Of his inspiration for the series Mel Brooks stated, “I was sick of looking at all those
sensible situation comedies. They were such distortions of life…No one had ever done a
show about an idiot before. I decided to be the first.”148 Obviously the satirical elements
can even be found in the title ‘Get Smart,’ as Agent Smart is anything but an intelligent
and witty spy. He was goofy and off-kilter, romantically inept where the humor often
came at his expense; however the entire premise of the series showed that the public
could laugh at serious times and draw humor despite living in a period of intense political
and social turmoil.
The series also spoofed the use of technological gadgetry, which most associated
with the nature of espionage during the war. Instead of trying to create realistic spy
gadgets for the secret agents, of course Get Smart got hilariously creative. One of the
most recognizable gadgets from the show was Agent Smart’s ‘shoe phone.’ He had to
remove his shoe and utilize it as an actual secret telephone line, with other telephones
hidden in all sorts of oddball objects. This created quite laughable situations and posed
scenarios that would never have been possible in real world Cold War spying. The aim
was not realism and gave a nice break from more serious subjects; yet it provided
tremendous entertainment, played to the public’s love of espionage, and was effective in
breaking from the mold of typical comedic series during the 1960s. Perhaps the most
notable gadget used in the series was the recurring ‘cone of silence.’ The contraption was
used at the insistence of Agent Smart in order to keep his conversations private with the
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chief. It looked like two plastic bubbles formed around the figures while they tried to
keep their conversations ‘quiet.’ The great joke and irony of the cone of silence was that
it actually worked opposite to the intended effects. Instead of prohibiting anyone outside
from hearing, it prevented the two inside from ever hearing one another. People on the
outside could quite easily hear exactly what was being said inside the cone. Again, such a
contraption was absolutely ludicrous in the real world, but it made for excellent
entertainment and became iconic for the series. It was also a jab at official government
secrecy when the enemy knew the score but Americans were kept in the dark, or silence
of national security.
Get Smart also spoofed the James Bond series by playing upon the use of fast cars
with technological gadgets and weapon capabilities. The series featured an incredible list
of guest stars and was nominated for multiple Emmy Awards, including Outstanding
Comedy Series in 1968 and 1969.149 Long after the debut of the spy series in 1965, Get
Smart was able to provide laughs and became a part of Cold War popular culture. It was
one of the longest running spy series on any network and was well-known for
catchphrases, funny gadgets, and comedic relief during a forceful period of change. Its
success further suggested that the public no longer wanted entertainment that came with
an agenda. They enjoyed the humor employed in the series, finding the lighter side to the
Cold War conflict. It also questioned the efficacy of American spies and spy agencies,
albeit in a humorous way.
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In 1966, the CBS network aired its own spy themed series, Mission: Impossible
(MI). The series was created by Bruce Gellar and ran from 1966-1973. Not to confuse the
television series with the highly successful film franchise (which was based on the
series); the television program revolved around a team of secret agents called the
Impossible Missions Force (IMF). The plot was typical of most spy stories at the time, in
that it followed the covert operations of the IMF agents who fought against evil
organizations and rogue despots. Initially the leader of IMF was the character Dan
Briggs; however by the second season the new head was replaced by the character Jim
Phelps. MI really did not use the Cold War as its ultimate backdrop; there was never an
actual government association either. Yet, the series did rely on the conventions of Cold
War spying in order to provide context for its secret agents and their impossible missions.
A few enemies named over the course of the years were the ‘European People’s
Republic’ and the ‘Eastern European Republic.’ Though not a direct reference to the
U.S.-Soviet conflict, it did reference the East-West struggle. One of the most iconic
legacies from the series was its theme song, which has been used in a variety of other
films and television commercials. The format of each episode followed the exact same
sequence: the opening, a tape scene, a dossier scene, an apartment, and then a plan for the
mission. The agents (also “integrated” racially and by gender) travelled across the globe,
much like the James Bond series. The standard chase, quest, fast cars, and gadgets were
all used in the series and the films.150 Although the series was not necessarily about the
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Cold War, it capitalized on the popular culture phenomenon of Cold War espionage
during the 1960s.
The films and television programs that grew out of the American (Western) thaw
all utilized new approaches in critiquing the political and social issues in the Cold War.
The era of censorship was now past and these artists were not willing to conform to
earlier ideals of ‘Americanism’ or the ‘nuclear family.’ They embraced the reforms of the
times and portrayed issues like mistrust, skepticism, and human fallibility. Themes like
espionage and the nuclear bomb became popular lenses through which to view the
Western predicament. Artists produced films and series that would not only bring in high
ratings, but would provide messages that resonated with an evolving society. Fearing a
Communist infiltration through the Party or spying was not nearly as scary as human
infallibility, the nuclear bomb, and worse, mistrust of their own government. There had
even been no great Communist conspiracy, as had once been projected through
propaganda. Looking at I Led Three Lives in juxtaposition to The Spy Who Came In From
The Cold or Dr. Strangelove, it is apparent that popular culture had undergone profound
changes. That change was mediated through Cultural Détente and would lead the public
towards the revolutionary reforms of the New Left and Counterculture movements.
The British were well-known for producing some of the greatest spy fiction
stories during the 20th Century. Joseph Conrad, John Buchan, Eric Ambler, Graham
Greene, Ian Fleming, and of course John le Carré were just a few of the myriad of
successful British espionage authors. When it came to producing a television series
during the 1960s, the United States would not be the only country to do it. The Prisoner
was a seventeen episode series created by Patrick McGoohan and George Markstein,
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running from 1967-1968. The Prisoner was far different from any other spy themed
television show at the time. It combined spy fiction, science fiction, thriller action, and
psychological twists in order to deliver a gallant critique over the contemporary state of
the Cold War. The Prisoner began a popular culture marvel and made a lasting
impression upon society even long after it aired on television. As the title suggests, the
series revolved around one man who was taken prisoner inside a remote island village. A
nightmare world, it appears to be the culmination of le Carré’s greatest fears of the West
in the Cold War. After quitting his espionage job, the man wakes up one day to find that
he has been captured and must now live inside this strange village where everyone
remains nameless. Instead of names, each person was assigned a number, with the main
character taking on the name as Number Six. He struggled against being captured inside
the village, even rejecting his new name. His foe throughout the series was a man named
Number Two. The intent of Number Two was to put Number Six through a selection of
methods in order to extract any information he may possess about his former job and life.
It is never revealed which ‘side’ Number Two was working for, but Number Six
consistently refused to give up any information he retained, regardless of the method used
against him. Number Two tried mind control, hallucinogens, identity theft, and
brainwashing in the attempt to force Number Six to reveal everything he knew. Despite
the efforts of his foe, Number Six always fought against these techniques and formulated
plans of his own. The problem with the village was that no one could escape and it was
impossible to tell who sided (or worked) for the East, and who sided with the West. The
people trapped their just lived average daily lives with the enemies disguised among
them. Number Six never does escape the village; but his plan did have an impact on
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influencing and disrupting the daily functions of the village. In the broader terms of the
Cold War, The Prisoner relied on symbolism to describe the contemporary issues society
faced in the East-West conflict. More serious than the American spy-themed television
programs, The Prisoner did not shy away from the larger themes, like the individual
against the collective. This was relayed through how Number Six stood in contrast from
the rest of the villagers. The village itself was essentially a small commune and the
techniques of extracting information appeared realistic and a bit chilling. Like John le
Carré’s narratives of intrigue, The Prisoner did not rely on flashy spy clichés. Instead, it
was intense and quite psychological, a factor that truly did translate in real world
espionage. 151On the lasting influence of the series on popular culture, Steve Rose of The
Guardian wrote, “It’s the Citizen Kane of British TV---a programme that changed the
landscape.”152 Overall, the television series had a lasting impact that became referenced
in movies, novels, comic books, and even other television shows. It opened the doors for
further experimentation with mind-altering thrillers, leaving a psychological impression
upon 1960s popular culture.
The variety of films and television series that have been analyzed over the course
of this chapter were all made possible by the contributions of Cultural Détente. Movies
and television shows in the 1950s followed the prototypical standards of the American
‘nuclear family,’ with an example like Leave it to Beaver. With the waning of those
values at the end of the decade came the bright new possibilities of exploring political
and social progress through different artistic mediums. The modern family dynamic was
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evolving away from the mold of the nuclear family. The public was becoming more
involved in effecting transformations through reforms. An innovative generation arose,
inspiring new legacies for the 1960s decade. These movements and reforms signaled the
ever present thaw from Cold War antagonisms.
John le Carré would lead the ‘thaw’ through his critiques about Western
involvement in the Cold War. His significance should not be minimized; for he was the
first to put all the pieces of Cultural Détente together. He formulated a critique that was
not just relevant to British society, but to Americans as well. His critiques came at the
right time, opening up the path for other artists. His insights, along with the artists that
followed, ushered in a new period for Cold War popular culture. Through satire, parody,
and allegory, the artists behind these creative projects proved that inspired lessons could
be retained through simple forms of mass entertainment.
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Conclusion
The deceptions of British double agent Kim Philby have played an integral role in
John le Carré’s personal life. Although le Carré has maintained that he retired from the
British Intelligence Services to focus on his writing career, it was Kim Philby who
officially ‘outed’ the author when he defected to the Soviet Union. Of course le Carré
was not the only one exposed at the time, but it does seem peculiar that Philby’s exposure
and his retirement came around the exact same time. We will probably never know the
full truth in this private circumstance, but we do know that le Carré possesses strong
feelings against the treachery committed by Kim Philby. Despite the criticisms le Carré
offered about the West, he did consider the democratic system as being the lesser of the
two evils in the Cold War conflict. He understood that he was allowed to propose
opposing views because it was a free society, even if he disliked the cynicism and
arrogance of the politicians and leaders in the West. Le Carré spent ample time carefully
crafting his arguments, but issues like Kim Philby seemed to cross a moral line. Philby
was everything that le Carré opposed; he was part of the British elite with a proper
education and connections that made him a part of the Establishment. Philby was so wellregarded in the British Intelligence Services that it was inconceivable that an
Establishment man could pull off such a grand heist for so long. As mentioned before, le
Carré blamed not just Kim Philby, but the entire system for turning their heads and
allowing Philby the freedom to act as he did. In many ways Philby embodied exactly
what le Carré believed was the greatest downfalls in British Intelligence and the
Establishment. Le Carré would contribute multiple introductions to books about Kim
Philby, making his sentiments on the subject perfectly clear. In his novel Tinker, Tailor,

Huesing 94

Soldier, Spy (1974) le Carré’s mole, Bill Haydon, has the exact same persona as the
notorious Soviet spy. Philby also held strong feelings about le Carré, especially upon
reading The Spy Who Came in From the Cold in 1963. Maybe it all hit too close to home
for the secret life he was living at the time, regardless he told his wife:
The Spy is very disappointing. It was a relief to read a somewhat sophisticated spy-story
after all that James Bond idiocy, and there are some well-thought out passages. But the
whole plot from beginning to end is basically implausible, and the implausibility keeps
obtruding itself --- at any rate, to anyone who has any real knowledge of the business!153

It is quite interesting that a man such as Philby was critiquing the measure of plausibility
by 1963. As we know, he defected the very next year, leaving every head shaking about
just what was plausible in the private world of Cold War espionage.
John le Carré was the first to anticipate Cultural Détente attitudes, making his
work essential expositions over the contemporary state of the Cold War. He used his spy
fiction narratives not only as a means for entertainment, but as a platform to denounce
Western methods in fighting the war. By the 1960s, the moral and ethical principles of
the Western cause was not only predominant, it was problematic. The conformities of the
1950s had weighed upon the public’s consciousness. In attempting to contain the
Communist threat, the governing powers pushed their own agenda upon popular culture.
For a society based on liberties and freedom, the governing authorities were acting in a
way that negated those choices in the first place. The anti-Communist reactionaries made
certain that extensive propaganda circulated in order to influence public perceptions of
the threat. These strategies became pervasive, disregarding civil liberties and personal
autonomy. Films, television, and literature acted as a means of influence, persuading
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American’s of the West’s righteous cause. Through forms of censorship, these mediums
often reflected the political ideals of anti-Communism and dangers within. The problem
was that by restricting freedoms of expression, the public would eventually become
weary of political involvement in social identities. After the death of Josef Stalin, citizens
no longer feared the Soviet threat as they once had. What they were beginning to fear was
their own governments. McCarthyism, the blacklists, and the conservative propaganda
showed that any form of dissent could be subjected to further consequences. For much of
the public, these activities were in fact un-American, creating a severe mistrust between
citizen and state.
By the end of the 1950s the rise of Cultural Détente signified that society was no
longer willing to accept political interferences without major reforms. As stated, le Carré
foresaw these attitudes because held the same sentiments, if not a bit more due to his
background inside the ‘Establishment’. He saw the broad picture: inflated powers with
confused ideologies; cynicism; betrayal; careerism; and self-serving elite. He understood
that his spy fiction narratives could not only amuse the public, but they could open up
new questions about the current costs of fighting in this war epic. During the early Cold
War governing powers limited the option of alternative viewpoints by enforcing the
status quo. But by the 1960s, alternative positions could no longer be denied. Tony
Barley stated, “liberalism’s instability constantly and implicitly demands of its adherents
that they confront the issue of taking sides---whenever, that is, coherent alternative
positions intrude upon their perception of things.”154 As John le Carré foresaw, Cultural
Détente became the way citizens were finally able to express those alternative positions.
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Trust in the government, the military, and the conservative policies that had politicized
culture for the last decade could no longer sustain an evolving society. The public
necessitated a thaw in tensions, whether at home or abroad. Le Carré judged these
alternatives and became a “commentator who is persuasive enough to direct mass
opinion.”155 He saw the same banalities in both Great Britain and the United States. He
knew the decline of England as an Imperial power had caused a crisis of identity---a fact
that trickled down into institutions, bureaucracies, education, intelligence, and ultimately
society. The United States was in no better condition; for their arrogance and cynicism
obscured the lines of their avowed moral distinctions. By enacting censorship, the
American’s were no different from their Soviet counterparts---and the comparisons do
not end there. By allowing the Communist threat to consume objectivity, the Western
powers neglected principles of democracy and became coercive in their attempts to win
the global war. It was inevitable that society would eventually break from the
conventions of the status quo. From the bottom up, citizens would facilitate change
through Cultural Détente.
Le Carré’s critiques helped to bring awareness, opening up alternative positions
and holding up a “kind of mirror” towards Western involvement in the Cold War.156 He
knew that his assessments of conditions were exactly what the public had been looking
for in the current state of confused ideologies. He stated, “I think that I filled a gap” and
that “I lived at the right time and wrote at the right moment.”157 It is interesting that le
Carré saw himself as bridging a gap precisely at the same time when Cultural Détente
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attitudes were proliferating in the West. Prior to his work, Ian Fleming had dominated the
spy fiction genre. But Fleming only served up tales that further conformed to the status
quo, failing to offer any serious comment about the Cold War.158 Le Carré knew that
readers had tired of the generic spy fiction formula; his novels would provide thoughtful
commentaries that deviated from this course. When it came to those commentaries, he
believed that keeping with the truth was what truly resonated with the public. He stated,
“I believe that most of us live in doubt and that is what animated the people who read my
book, they felt ‘Well gosh, this is organised chaos, there is no solution.’”159 Le Carré was
not only speaking about the fictional situations posed in his novels. He was commenting
about the entire status of the Cold War, knowing that the public was ready to embrace a
change. As he mentioned, there was no solution, nor did he profess to have the answers to
the myriad of problems. What he did offer was the recognition that the old methods of
conducting warfare were no longer applicable by the 1960s.
The elusive and ideological nature of the Cold War meant that the ‘enemy’ was
not so easily discernable. Kim Philby had been the enemy, but was able to hide within the
Establishment because he epitomized old world attributes. The predictabilities of the past
had provided him the perfect front. As implausible as his betrayal was, it further proved
that the West was in need of serious revisions. Naturally le Carré was quite conscious of
the growing dissent, knowing that his spy narratives found a broad audience due to the
nature of his critiques. During an interview about his books he stated:
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There are a lot of people who believe that their own doubts are subordinate to the national
need…I do believe these doubts are very much found…particularly in the States. I think
it did exactly catch a mood where values are dissolving so fast that we just want to stop
the film running and look at one frame…Ever since the hot war turned into the Cold War
and the Cold War turned into détente, we’ve gone through a succession of lunatic
ideological reversals: people who were bombing Berlin in 1945 were running the airlift in
1948 and its gone back and forth ever since.160

He acknowledged that the values of democracy were disappearing because Western
powers had lost sight of their true purpose. Le Carré was not a political author; but rather
an author for whom “meaningful experience and moral life are not disengaged from
politics.”161 It was unfeasible to write about the Cold War without demonstrating the
value in conflict. His plots and characters would not follow spy fiction formulas of the
past; instead he would use them as a means to expose the predicaments of the time. Le
Carré felt that spy fiction served as the perfect outlet for his broader messages. Spies
were the infantrymen in the unconventional Cold War struggle. They combined the
“thoughts with deeds” that politicians were unable to do through public avenues. 162 He
also stated, “At the moment, when we have no ideology, and our politics are in shambles,
I find it a convenient microcosm, to shuffle around in a secret world and make that
expressive of the overt world.”163 Not only was his spy fiction entertaining, it served a
higher purpose in expressing Cultural Détente attitudes.
John le Carré and other artists in the 1960s broke from the conventions of the past
by using their mediums to critique, satirize, and parody the Cold War. Through
espionage, the atomic bomb, doomsday devices, or silly antics, these artists provided new
insights over the global crisis. Film, television, and literature often reflects popular trends
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in mainstream culture. Through influence they can shape public perception and gather
support. Certainly le Carré’s readers felt they had a better idea of Intelligence Services
from reading his novels, even if they were based on fiction. Yet, they still influenced how
people perceived the esoteric world. Art is also affected by cultural demands. The antiCommunist films of the ‘fifties’ fell deaf because there was a lack of interest among
audiences. They simply did not want political propaganda as a means of entertainment;
not to mention its blatant agenda. By the time Cultural Détente attitudes mounted, artists
understood public interests; for they held the exact same attitudes. By utilizing Cold War
themes with new interpretations, these mediums could both shape and influence the
public at the same time.
Cultural Détente opened the doors for change in the East-West conflict. The
methods of the past were no longer feasible for contemporary times. Society was
embracing revolutionary reforms that would transform Cold War popular culture. Blind
trust in governing powers as the defenders of liberal democracy no longer fit the needs of
its adherents. With any protracted war society eventually grows weary; but it was the
oppressive tactics of their own governing authorities that led society towards the thaw.
Freedom of expression and alternative views finally allowed popular culture to move
beyond politics and embrace the relaxation of Cold War tensions.
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